2005年十大科技趨勢
李鐏龍
時序推移，又是新春伊始，展望人類科技發展前景，專家認為有十大趨勢將別具重要性，分別是：網誌族 群（WebBlog或Blog）勢力異軍突起、無線傳輸（Wi-Fi）打造真正數位家庭、微軟英特爾（WinTel）共霸結構趨向鬆散、基因醫療科技長足 進步、手機瑞士刀（多功能）化、生化辨識及監測設備需求大增、中國開始轉向重視智慧財產權保護、美國加強軍用機器人研發及部署、判讀人類思想的掃瞄科技作 為行銷利器及核能發電再度受到重視。這十大趨勢涵蓋層面甚廣，舉凡個人、家庭、企業、社會、國家、文化、網路、媒體、消費、娛樂、隱私、能源、國家安全 等，都在影響範圍之內，因此值得深入探討，茲分述如下：
網誌族群影響力大第一、依附網際網路而生的網誌族群，將快速繁衍且影響力大增，蔚 為一股任何企業或公眾人物都不容忽視的力量，這從去年美國總統大選中各候選人凝聚支持者人氣、CBS主播丹拉瑟（Dan Rather）因被証明報導不實而提早退休、U型鎖大廠Kryptonite公司不得不承認產品瑕疵而在短短十天內損失約千萬美元等事件，均已可顯見一 斑。
微軟電腦在去年十二月一日推出名為MSN Spaces的新線上服務，要和現為全球網誌服務規模最大的Google相關系統一較長短，說明網誌軟體及網誌族群，已成為線上服務業者兵家必爭之地。據 專門研究網誌搜尋引擎與評鑑的Technorati公司統計，網誌族群目前係以每天增加二萬三千個（約每三秒一個）的速度在成長，其中每新增加一個，都將 助長網際網路所帶來的一股無法避免趨勢：權力與意見的民主化。
資訊界人士指出，網誌是妙不可言的人際溝通工具，是最理想但也最難掌控的資 訊傳送方式，善用之，可以變成與新、舊客戶溝通的絕佳管道，反之，也可能成為公共關係上的夢魘。網誌代表著個人自我出版發行的實踐，也意味著業餘媒體的興 起，不僅為傳統媒體帶來挑戰，更將改變廣告、行銷、公關等從業人員的工作模式。
無線傳輸蔚為主流
第二、已普遍進駐一般家 庭但目前還各自為政的iPod、DVD播放機、數位錄影機、數位電視、數位音響、數位相片、數位資訊、電動遊戲機等產品，在二○○五年將進入「透過無線傳 輸（Wi-Fi）科技而可相互聯結」的階段，但受限於價格關係，暫時將僅少數人會有能力或有意願去構建及享受真正數位家庭環境。
軟硬結合雙主共抱
第三、微軟軟體結合英特爾微處理器的共霸（WinTel）結構將趨向鬆散，雙方並會各自加強與對方的競爭對手合作，如微軟與超微（AMD）在高、低階個人電腦上密切配合，而英特爾也開始努力推動Linux作業系統或其他開放軟體。
微 軟視窗作業系統與英特爾系列微處理器，是兩個在各自領域都近乎壟斷的強勢產品，搭配起來的組合曾經銳不可當，但其鋒利性近來隨著科技日新月異而逐漸有鈍化 跡象，尤其是網路問世激生出眾多的新設備與新軟體服務，讓企業與消費者見證到WinTel已非唯一或最穩當的選擇。預料今後這一趨向將更顯著。
這 兩家企業雖仍擁有良好獲利能力，但營運上卻各自面臨逐漸流失市場的挑戰，如微軟在開放軟體的強敵壓境下，其作業系統與應用軟體都有淪為低價化商品之虞，而 英特爾也陷入無法甩開超微(AMD)競爭的窘境，另外兩者也都頻頻發生新產品開發進度嚴重落後情事。微軟已投下巨資切入手機市場，英特爾也積極挺進通訊與 消費性電子應用領域，兩者應會繼續深化相關的努力。
基因生技當代顯學
第四、基因生技緊療技術將大步躍進，所謂的RNAi 干擾療程可望很快獲准進行人體實驗。美國 Alnylam製藥公司在大幅降低膽固醇的療程上，即循靜脈方式投遞生化科技藥物，以避開人體免疫系統的攔截，已獲致重大突破，並已成功見效於鼠體實驗 上，接下來可望很快就獲准展開人體實驗，則距離最終上市銷售又朝前跨進一大步。
手機多功能消費者至上
第五、手機瑞士刀 （多功能）化，單純電話的機種恐成絕響。拜電話公司終於構建出高速網路，及更快速與更聰明的手機晶片問世之賜，電話搭配上無線上網、MP3、電子遊戲、數 位照相、影音短訊或其他用途的複功能或多功能高階手機，將成為市場主流，但因為消費者口味有差異性，業者間將有一場區隔行銷的硬仗要打。
生化監測防偽利器
第 六、以人為對象的生化監測設備，銷售將大幅成長。為有效防範恐怖攻擊威脅及日益氾濫的身分竊盜犯罪，可以辨識個人特徵（如指紋、面貌等）的監測設備，尤其 是能夠從群眾中比對出或鎖定特定個人者，如雷射或生化掃瞄儀等，將成為搶手貨。據 Biometric顧問公司估計，全球相關產品的銷售額，二○○五年將超過十八億美元，較二○○三年的近七億二千萬美元增加一倍有餘，到二○○八年時更將 增至四十八億美元，而且還不包括以數十億美元計的服務營收。另外，中央情報局持續以資金挹注問諜科技，像可監看網路聊天室設備或軟體，或具全球衛星定位作 用的出租汽車用黑盒子電腦等。
保護智財權中國邁大步
第七、中國將開始轉為重視智慧財產權保護。中國政府在這方面已採取一些動作，包括要求公家機關使用合法授權的軟體、允許法官對違反智財權嫌犯發出禁止使用命令、邀請美國專利當局教授中國法官與檢察官如何進行查緝及審判、修訂中國的著作權與專利權法規等。
軍用機器人美加強研發
第八、美國將加強軍用機器人的研發及部署。在二○○五內，美國將開始正式部署由Foster- Miller公司生產的SWORDS戰士級機器人。事實上，目前最少已有一百具規格類似但未經武裝的機器人，派駐在伊拉克及阿富汗服役，執行街巡、搜查及解除路邊爆裂物等任務。
掃描科技大為暢銷
第九、可判讀人類想法的掃瞄科技，將被運用作為行銷利器。一種名為功能性磁共振影像（fRMI）的功能強大掃瞄科技，即將從實驗室修成正果，可望立即成為行銷人員判讀消費者情緒與動機的利器。
核能發電鹹魚翻生
第十、核能發電將重新獲得重視。石油及天然氣價格高漲、無法確保能源供應穩定、天氣巨烈變化衍生潛在威脅等因素交相作用，讓核能發電近來鹹魚翻身，又重新獲得重視。
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Thursday, February 10, 2005
Thursday, January 13, 2005
如何同時容納多種無線標準 手機業者費思量
作者：Rick Merritt / EETimes
隨著各種不同的無線技術與應用紛紛浮現，業者們都希望能在行動電話中搶佔到一個有利位置。然而，體積越做越小的手機，到底能塞進多少種無線技術？這正是行動電話製造商們傷腦筋想要知道的問題。
一台未來的手機中可能需要支援多種不同的廣域無線網路，以提供語音、全球衛星定位服務、新興的FM收音機、以及至少一種的802.11規格以連結到網際網路熱點。而在個人區域網路(PAN)方面，則有藍芽、紅外線傳輸、近場通訊(NFC)、超寬頻(UWB)、Zigbee，甚至RFID等眾多技術備選，開始覺得頭痛了嗎？
的確，我們擁有的無線標準實在是太多了，特別是在PAN方面，因此，在未來的幾年內，一或二個技術相互整合或是被淘汰的情況是極有可能發生的。但於此同時，三個或更多的廣域無線標準也紛紛浮上檯面，市場就像展開了一場零和遊戲。
工程師們開始熱烈的討論，是否藍芽應該採用UWB的實體層作為其下一代規格，以便為技術的整合先行準備。此外，藍芽、近場通訊和紅外線傳輸也悄悄地重新進入市場，試圖成為未來電子付款的傳輸方式。
在廣域網路方面，目前至少有三項技術號稱能將電視功能帶進手機，以搶奪預計在2006年開始起飛的市場中分一杯羹。於此同時，WiMax也瞄準了手機針對數據傳輸的長距離、高速服務市場。
易利信行動平台部門的首席科學家Jaap Haartsen表示，「現有的無線標準實在太多了！光是要瞭解它們的技術內涵，各種技術的差異，以及如何在市場上向消費者推廣，就不是一件容易的事。」
戴爾電腦(Dell)的資深通訊技術人員Pratik Mehta指出，「市場上同時出現了這麼多的技術，而我們正儘可能地利用每一種技術。」然而撇開手機不談，光是要在體積較大的筆記型電腦中建置所有的這些功能，「功耗、干擾、天線的放置等問題就需要解決」，他說。
飛利浦半導體公司無線事業部總經理Paul Marino也說，「在現有的技術問題尚未解決以前，我們似乎讓工程師們創造出太多的標準了！」
的確，像是戴爾電腦、飛利浦這類的大公司，他們有足夠的人力來為各種不同應用開發出多種的無線標準。但是，廠商們也開始停止試圖將每一種技術塞到電子產品中，而是試圖轉向尋求與其他業者之間的合作。
Zigbee聯盟主席Bob Heile指出，「明年年中以前，我們將開始嘗試建立一些與其他組織的溝通管道，但我們得先想好我們的目標是什麼。不管怎麼說，專注總是一件好事。」為尋求整合，Heile說他將積極地與RFID的倡議者合作，但眼前最大的機會可能是與藍芽整合。
藍芽特別小組(SIG)最近上任的技術總監Michael Foley表示，「就整合眾多無線標準所做的努力來看，我們的確是做的太少，我相信以後會做的更好，這也將會是我未來努力的目標。」更明確的說，藍芽 SIG將辯論是否要採用480-Mbit/second的UWB實體層規格來作為下一代高速藍芽的標準，而此標準最初只定義在10Mbits/s而已。
宣稱在藍芽晶片市佔率高達47%的Cambridge Silicon Radio(CSR)公司表示，樂見藍芽與UWB的整合，戴爾電腦也是如此。但是也開發藍芽元件的易利信則表示反對。Nokia和Broadcom在公開場合中，則持中立立場。
CSR希望Bluetooth SIG能夠持續規範其技術，而不是將它開放給更廣泛的IEEE組織。但是，CSR卻也同時希望SIG能採納UWB。對晶片業者來說，此舉將能夠擴展它的既有市場，從手機和週邊，進入到消費性電子。SIG預計將在6個月內做出決定。
Dell的Mehta說，「我們希望下一代的無線PAN能具備擴充性」，在未來幾年內能從現在的1-Mbit/s藍芽擴展到1-Gbit/s UWB規格。Mehta指出，他已經看到有一些公司開始這方面的技術開發。
Ericsson的Haartsen指出，藍芽可以在數百公尺的範圍內達到目前的megabit數據率，但是UWB只能在1公尺的距離內才能達到最快的傳輸率，他提出的問題是，「你要如何向使用者解釋這點？」
雖然尚未表達其明確立場，但Nokia的高階主管也認為，日益興起的802.11 ad hoc網路功能可能會搶走一些藍芽的重要應用。還有一些業界人士則表示，UWB還有太多問題要解決，把未來都賭在這項技術上，風險太高。
宣稱有150項藍芽晶片成功設計案例的Broadcom公司則是靜觀其變。該公司的技術長Henry Samueli表示，「我們正在觀察UWB，有可能它會成為藍芽的下一代技術，但目前並不明確這樣的發展是否可行。」
無線收銀機
從應用面來看，藍芽、紅外線傳輸、和近場通訊(NFC)都在角逐成為手機或PDA無線付款的備選技術。紅外線傳輸協會主席Ron Brown表示，在南韓，已經有四萬家的零售商和300萬隻的手機參與了紅外線電子付款的測試計畫。
或許有人會對紅外線傳輸仍然健在感到非常訝異。即使是Brown也承認，據估計在1.5億支具備紅外線功能的手機中，大概只有5%的人真的會用到這項技術，這個現象在筆記型電腦也是如此。Brown說，「紅外線傳輸曾被視為最成功的科技失敗者。要建置這項技術非常麻煩，此情況直到Windows 2000發表後才有改善。」
目前，在日本，由安捷倫和其他公司所支援的IrFM標準，可讓使用者透過紅外線傳輸將其信用卡或金融卡資料安全地從行動裝置傳送到付款設備。同時在今年初，日本的電信業者Docomo也宣佈，該公司的Foma手機能夠透過紅外線來控制家用電器。
德州儀器公司無線終端部門的技術專家Rick Wietfeldt指出，「我們客戶仍然要求晶片組上需具備一個IrDA埠，看來紅外線傳輸短時間內是不會消失的。」
安全性是無線付款的一個重要議題，對紅外線傳輸而言，因為它屬於視線(line-of-sight)連接，這比藍芽採用廣播-無線(broadcast- radio)的方式具有優勢。Brown說，「銀行業者喜歡採用紅外線傳輸，因為它是短距離、點對點的方式。你不可能會傳送重要的財務資料給站在你後面的人。」
TI的Wietfeldt認為，紅外線傳輸較其他競爭技術更為安全的這種認知將會逐漸降低。「當人們更瞭解RF無線的安全性後，IrDA就會被放在一邊了。」他說。
CSR公司曾經展示過該公司新一代BlueCore 5的安全特性。當藍芽連接完成時，此晶片能夠根據距離，鎖定到單一的接收器上，再進行與其他裝置的通訊。CSR的Collinson說，「透過這種方式，我們就不會將資料傳送給其他人了。」
然而，藍芽還有其他的問題，使其無法進入到電子付款的領域：使用者無法用像是刷ATM卡的方式，很快地就完成付款資料的傳送。這是因為藍芽連結需要較複雜的設定過程，而這部份工作是透過軟體來執行的。
TI手機晶片行銷總監Avner Goren表示，「我認為用藍芽來進行付款動作，有點太複雜了。」他指出，在日本，已經有許多手機是透過近場通訊來進行電子付款的。
今年三月，Nokia、Philips和Sony共同成立了NFC論壇來開發與推廣此技術。NFC是在13.56MHz頻帶操作，傳輸距離10公分以內。即使目前通用的傳輸率為106到212kbits/s，但該論壇仍宣稱NFC未來可達到1Mbit/s的速度。Motorola、Nokia和 Samsung曾表示，他們的手機將會支援此技術。目前，只有Philips提供NFC晶片。
此外，行動電話的下一件大事就是數位電視。TI的Goren說，接收電視將會鼓勵使用者更頻繁地使用手機，進而帶動一些新的網路流量成長，像是現場電視節目的投票應用等。
目前有幾種RF的設計方式，可以將數位電視帶進手機。歐洲有DVB-H標準、日本有ISDB標準。在美國，加強的vestigial-sideband方式是數位電視規範的一部份，而韓國正在試驗衛星電視。
今年秋天，TI宣佈了其Hollywood整合晶片支援DVB-H和ISDB，此晶片將於明年開始送樣，2006年正式生產。Goren指出，「美國得決定到底要採用哪種行動電視標準，但是我不認為在這方面會有任何的法律規範。」
TI之後，Qualcomm也於11月1日宣佈，將耗資8億美金在美國推出專屬的行動電視廣播服務，採用700-MHz的頻譜。Qualcomm最近成立的子公司MediaFLO USA，將會整合從有線電視、衛星電視等服務供應商取得的內容，預計最慢在2006年推出50到100個全國性與地區性的頻道，其中包括15個現場的串流頻道，以及數個視訊短片和音樂頻道。Qualcomm的手機整合晶片組──MBD1000，將會支援此項服務。
但是觀察家認為，Qualcomm的計畫太過昂貴，因為它需要新的基礎建設，而這在美國是受到限制的。Envisioneering顧問公司的主席 Richard Doherty表示，「我們有充分的理由相信，Qualcomm的這項轉投資廣播業務將會與其CDMA技術一樣，獲得全球性的成功。」然而， Doherty卻認為，等到明年一月的消費性電子展時，「我們將會看到各種的手持數位電視接受器方案，而這些都是不需要新的手機基礎建設。」
更有甚者，戴爾電腦的Mehta說，他可以預見到2006年，等到100Mbits/s的802.16e標準通過後，WiMax便可開始提供70-Mbit/s的廣域連接性，這極有可能會與蜂巢式的無線數據標準競爭。
但是，Broadcom的Samueli卻不看好WiMax。他說，該公司曾經開發過兩種寬頻無線晶片，但都沒有成功。最近的一個例子是與Cisco共同合作開發的晶片，原本計畫要提供給MCI和Sprint等電信業者，傳輸速度為70Mbits/s。
Samueli說，「我們的生產計畫都已經訂好了。但是MCI和Sprint無法解決業務模式的問題，最後只好取消了這個計畫。我們已經擁有這樣的技術，但是沒有人可以提出一個可行的業務模式。」Samueli強調，「現在市場上有十多種的無線技術，但我們無法每一項都投資。」
《電子工程專輯》
Original Link
隨著各種不同的無線技術與應用紛紛浮現，業者們都希望能在行動電話中搶佔到一個有利位置。然而，體積越做越小的手機，到底能塞進多少種無線技術？這正是行動電話製造商們傷腦筋想要知道的問題。
一台未來的手機中可能需要支援多種不同的廣域無線網路，以提供語音、全球衛星定位服務、新興的FM收音機、以及至少一種的802.11規格以連結到網際網路熱點。而在個人區域網路(PAN)方面，則有藍芽、紅外線傳輸、近場通訊(NFC)、超寬頻(UWB)、Zigbee，甚至RFID等眾多技術備選，開始覺得頭痛了嗎？
的確，我們擁有的無線標準實在是太多了，特別是在PAN方面，因此，在未來的幾年內，一或二個技術相互整合或是被淘汰的情況是極有可能發生的。但於此同時，三個或更多的廣域無線標準也紛紛浮上檯面，市場就像展開了一場零和遊戲。
工程師們開始熱烈的討論，是否藍芽應該採用UWB的實體層作為其下一代規格，以便為技術的整合先行準備。此外，藍芽、近場通訊和紅外線傳輸也悄悄地重新進入市場，試圖成為未來電子付款的傳輸方式。
在廣域網路方面，目前至少有三項技術號稱能將電視功能帶進手機，以搶奪預計在2006年開始起飛的市場中分一杯羹。於此同時，WiMax也瞄準了手機針對數據傳輸的長距離、高速服務市場。
易利信行動平台部門的首席科學家Jaap Haartsen表示，「現有的無線標準實在太多了！光是要瞭解它們的技術內涵，各種技術的差異，以及如何在市場上向消費者推廣，就不是一件容易的事。」
戴爾電腦(Dell)的資深通訊技術人員Pratik Mehta指出，「市場上同時出現了這麼多的技術，而我們正儘可能地利用每一種技術。」然而撇開手機不談，光是要在體積較大的筆記型電腦中建置所有的這些功能，「功耗、干擾、天線的放置等問題就需要解決」，他說。
飛利浦半導體公司無線事業部總經理Paul Marino也說，「在現有的技術問題尚未解決以前，我們似乎讓工程師們創造出太多的標準了！」
的確，像是戴爾電腦、飛利浦這類的大公司，他們有足夠的人力來為各種不同應用開發出多種的無線標準。但是，廠商們也開始停止試圖將每一種技術塞到電子產品中，而是試圖轉向尋求與其他業者之間的合作。
Zigbee聯盟主席Bob Heile指出，「明年年中以前，我們將開始嘗試建立一些與其他組織的溝通管道，但我們得先想好我們的目標是什麼。不管怎麼說，專注總是一件好事。」為尋求整合，Heile說他將積極地與RFID的倡議者合作，但眼前最大的機會可能是與藍芽整合。
藍芽特別小組(SIG)最近上任的技術總監Michael Foley表示，「就整合眾多無線標準所做的努力來看，我們的確是做的太少，我相信以後會做的更好，這也將會是我未來努力的目標。」更明確的說，藍芽 SIG將辯論是否要採用480-Mbit/second的UWB實體層規格來作為下一代高速藍芽的標準，而此標準最初只定義在10Mbits/s而已。
宣稱在藍芽晶片市佔率高達47%的Cambridge Silicon Radio(CSR)公司表示，樂見藍芽與UWB的整合，戴爾電腦也是如此。但是也開發藍芽元件的易利信則表示反對。Nokia和Broadcom在公開場合中，則持中立立場。
CSR希望Bluetooth SIG能夠持續規範其技術，而不是將它開放給更廣泛的IEEE組織。但是，CSR卻也同時希望SIG能採納UWB。對晶片業者來說，此舉將能夠擴展它的既有市場，從手機和週邊，進入到消費性電子。SIG預計將在6個月內做出決定。
Dell的Mehta說，「我們希望下一代的無線PAN能具備擴充性」，在未來幾年內能從現在的1-Mbit/s藍芽擴展到1-Gbit/s UWB規格。Mehta指出，他已經看到有一些公司開始這方面的技術開發。
Ericsson的Haartsen指出，藍芽可以在數百公尺的範圍內達到目前的megabit數據率，但是UWB只能在1公尺的距離內才能達到最快的傳輸率，他提出的問題是，「你要如何向使用者解釋這點？」
雖然尚未表達其明確立場，但Nokia的高階主管也認為，日益興起的802.11 ad hoc網路功能可能會搶走一些藍芽的重要應用。還有一些業界人士則表示，UWB還有太多問題要解決，把未來都賭在這項技術上，風險太高。
宣稱有150項藍芽晶片成功設計案例的Broadcom公司則是靜觀其變。該公司的技術長Henry Samueli表示，「我們正在觀察UWB，有可能它會成為藍芽的下一代技術，但目前並不明確這樣的發展是否可行。」
無線收銀機
從應用面來看，藍芽、紅外線傳輸、和近場通訊(NFC)都在角逐成為手機或PDA無線付款的備選技術。紅外線傳輸協會主席Ron Brown表示，在南韓，已經有四萬家的零售商和300萬隻的手機參與了紅外線電子付款的測試計畫。
或許有人會對紅外線傳輸仍然健在感到非常訝異。即使是Brown也承認，據估計在1.5億支具備紅外線功能的手機中，大概只有5%的人真的會用到這項技術，這個現象在筆記型電腦也是如此。Brown說，「紅外線傳輸曾被視為最成功的科技失敗者。要建置這項技術非常麻煩，此情況直到Windows 2000發表後才有改善。」
目前，在日本，由安捷倫和其他公司所支援的IrFM標準，可讓使用者透過紅外線傳輸將其信用卡或金融卡資料安全地從行動裝置傳送到付款設備。同時在今年初，日本的電信業者Docomo也宣佈，該公司的Foma手機能夠透過紅外線來控制家用電器。
德州儀器公司無線終端部門的技術專家Rick Wietfeldt指出，「我們客戶仍然要求晶片組上需具備一個IrDA埠，看來紅外線傳輸短時間內是不會消失的。」
安全性是無線付款的一個重要議題，對紅外線傳輸而言，因為它屬於視線(line-of-sight)連接，這比藍芽採用廣播-無線(broadcast- radio)的方式具有優勢。Brown說，「銀行業者喜歡採用紅外線傳輸，因為它是短距離、點對點的方式。你不可能會傳送重要的財務資料給站在你後面的人。」
TI的Wietfeldt認為，紅外線傳輸較其他競爭技術更為安全的這種認知將會逐漸降低。「當人們更瞭解RF無線的安全性後，IrDA就會被放在一邊了。」他說。
CSR公司曾經展示過該公司新一代BlueCore 5的安全特性。當藍芽連接完成時，此晶片能夠根據距離，鎖定到單一的接收器上，再進行與其他裝置的通訊。CSR的Collinson說，「透過這種方式，我們就不會將資料傳送給其他人了。」
然而，藍芽還有其他的問題，使其無法進入到電子付款的領域：使用者無法用像是刷ATM卡的方式，很快地就完成付款資料的傳送。這是因為藍芽連結需要較複雜的設定過程，而這部份工作是透過軟體來執行的。
TI手機晶片行銷總監Avner Goren表示，「我認為用藍芽來進行付款動作，有點太複雜了。」他指出，在日本，已經有許多手機是透過近場通訊來進行電子付款的。
今年三月，Nokia、Philips和Sony共同成立了NFC論壇來開發與推廣此技術。NFC是在13.56MHz頻帶操作，傳輸距離10公分以內。即使目前通用的傳輸率為106到212kbits/s，但該論壇仍宣稱NFC未來可達到1Mbit/s的速度。Motorola、Nokia和 Samsung曾表示，他們的手機將會支援此技術。目前，只有Philips提供NFC晶片。
此外，行動電話的下一件大事就是數位電視。TI的Goren說，接收電視將會鼓勵使用者更頻繁地使用手機，進而帶動一些新的網路流量成長，像是現場電視節目的投票應用等。
目前有幾種RF的設計方式，可以將數位電視帶進手機。歐洲有DVB-H標準、日本有ISDB標準。在美國，加強的vestigial-sideband方式是數位電視規範的一部份，而韓國正在試驗衛星電視。
今年秋天，TI宣佈了其Hollywood整合晶片支援DVB-H和ISDB，此晶片將於明年開始送樣，2006年正式生產。Goren指出，「美國得決定到底要採用哪種行動電視標準，但是我不認為在這方面會有任何的法律規範。」
TI之後，Qualcomm也於11月1日宣佈，將耗資8億美金在美國推出專屬的行動電視廣播服務，採用700-MHz的頻譜。Qualcomm最近成立的子公司MediaFLO USA，將會整合從有線電視、衛星電視等服務供應商取得的內容，預計最慢在2006年推出50到100個全國性與地區性的頻道，其中包括15個現場的串流頻道，以及數個視訊短片和音樂頻道。Qualcomm的手機整合晶片組──MBD1000，將會支援此項服務。
但是觀察家認為，Qualcomm的計畫太過昂貴，因為它需要新的基礎建設，而這在美國是受到限制的。Envisioneering顧問公司的主席 Richard Doherty表示，「我們有充分的理由相信，Qualcomm的這項轉投資廣播業務將會與其CDMA技術一樣，獲得全球性的成功。」然而， Doherty卻認為，等到明年一月的消費性電子展時，「我們將會看到各種的手持數位電視接受器方案，而這些都是不需要新的手機基礎建設。」
更有甚者，戴爾電腦的Mehta說，他可以預見到2006年，等到100Mbits/s的802.16e標準通過後，WiMax便可開始提供70-Mbit/s的廣域連接性，這極有可能會與蜂巢式的無線數據標準競爭。
但是，Broadcom的Samueli卻不看好WiMax。他說，該公司曾經開發過兩種寬頻無線晶片，但都沒有成功。最近的一個例子是與Cisco共同合作開發的晶片，原本計畫要提供給MCI和Sprint等電信業者，傳輸速度為70Mbits/s。
Samueli說，「我們的生產計畫都已經訂好了。但是MCI和Sprint無法解決業務模式的問題，最後只好取消了這個計畫。我們已經擁有這樣的技術，但是沒有人可以提出一個可行的業務模式。」Samueli強調，「現在市場上有十多種的無線技術，但我們無法每一項都投資。」
《電子工程專輯》
Tuesday, January 11, 2005
如何正確看待WiMax
Anthony Plewes/Silicon.com‧郭和杰譯 2005/01/10
Original Link
WiMax似乎已經變成一種無所不能的技術：它是DSL及纜線數據上網的替代方案；當作熱點技術更大更好用；它是偏遠地區的寬頻上網救星；甚至還可能是3G的殺手。
這些神話可說源起於英特爾對這項技術的鼎力支持。英特爾的行銷機制已經將行動電話對固網電話的影響拿來比喻WiMax預期對DSL及纜線上網的影響。以英特爾先前為了Wi-Fi而大力推動Centrino的力度來看，要推展WiMax自然絕非難事。
WiMax在發展的早期階段裡所將面臨的問題可能在於，一頭熱的廠商們對這個技術的看法都各取所需，而沒有辦法為它的最佳應用提出一個明確的訊息。所推動的應用過於紛歧──從行動寬頻到無線高速通訊，甚至偏遠地區的寬頻上網──這絕對把WiMax說得太偉大了。
WiMax必需與它的競爭技術放在一起來看──在廣域（wide area）方面先前已有許多無線固網技術存在，例如LMDS及MMDS。Wi-Fi的出現是要彌補區域網路（LAN）與藍芽（Bluetooth）之間的空隙。如果你想要行動性，現在全世界已經都在行動基地台的覆蓋之下了。
那WiMax的位子到底在哪裡？
WiMax其實是以IEEE 802.16標準的技術為基礎所創造出來的一個行銷名字。這項技術的發展原本是要支援10至66GHz頻段之間一對多的寬頻無線上網。這種技術有許多種部署，可以支援標準的無線固網寬頻到手機上的行動數據等各種不同應用。
它的主要目的是要用在都會網路上。當然，這種技術用在戶外寬頻上絕對比Wi-Fi更適合。例如，一台WiMax網路基地台，其覆蓋範圍可達到3公里之大。
就像其他技術一樣，WiMax也有一個專門組織在管理，讓原本就夠亂的情況更加混淆。WiMax Forum(WiMax論壇)組織正在為固接、漫遊、可攜式裝置，甚至還有無線寬頻上網開發新的標準（不需要直線對準基地台就可連線）。該組織表示這項技術可以為固接及可攜式裝置提供每個頻道40Mbps的傳輸率；而行動裝置可達15Mbps，後者至少要到2007年才有實現的希望。
雖然有英特爾的力挺，讓WiMax可以在眾多的無線技術中脫穎而出，但這並無法保證這項技術的成功。英特爾過去對於未來技術的眼光，也不是沒有看錯的記錄。在加入Wi-Fi行列之前，英特爾還是HomeRF(已壽終正寢)技術的大護法，後來轉而支持Wi-Fi可說引起市場一陣嘩然。
部份媒體過度「膨風」對WiMax來說也是個警訊。當Radioactive連絡WiMax Forum時，一位董事會成員告訴我們，很多過度吹噓的說法都是來自新創公司：「70Mbps的速度根本是亂講。」他表示，「1至10還比較差不多。」
英特爾可能比較喜歡大家為WiMax敲鑼打鼓，但其他的科技大廠則相當保留。例如，思科（Cisco）的技術長Charles Giancarlo最近就對這項技術潑了冷水，主要的原因是該技術的應用已經在3G行動網路的範圍內──在WiMax要進入市場時可能全球都在使用3G 了。
WiMax要找到焦點並成熟化，還有待業界的廣泛支持──不只是那些開發這項技術標準的廠商，還有那些敵對技術的廠商。事實上，技術上的互補絕對比競爭來得好。例如，WiMax可能和Wi-Fi有很好的結合。WiMax可以用來把寬頻連到大樓，而Wi-Fi則提供大樓內的上網。利用內建了Wi-Fi上網功能的WiMax CPE標準很容易就做到這一點。
WiMax Forum正在建立互通性的認證程序，這一點也不令人意外，畢竟這裡面有許多人都是固接無線寬頻技術的業界老鳥，他們深知這塊市場過去一直缺少市場標準而滯礙難行。
WiMax論壇預計要在2005年6月成立西班牙的實驗室，並從9月開始做互通性的認證。該實驗室將做產品的互通性測試，同時也會為相容的產品發行標章。也就是說，第一款具有WiMax認證的產品將會在2005年底到2006年間上市。
但還是有部分電信營運商等不及標準出爐就先推出產品。例如，BT（英國電信）已經在蘇格蘭及北愛爾蘭部署了郊區的寬頻無線上網技術Alvarion。本身是WiMax董事會成員的BT宣稱，他們的技術將會與WiMax標準相容。
盡管媒體大力哄抬，我們假設有朝一日WiMax真的消聲匿跡了，這也不是第一個跳票的無線技術。這讓人回想到LMDS及MMDS等固接的無線寬頻技術的命運，這些WiMax前輩技術的頻譜競標後來都以失敗告終。缺乏標準化意味著網路設備會很昂貴，且業者也擔心所支持的技術到頭來竟是大而無用，這也是為何電信業者不急著跟進的主因。
WiMax Forum必須確保這項技術能夠吸引電信業者利用它來提供行動數據服務。WiMax已經讓部分現有技術廠商感到傷腦筋，特別是3G設備製造商。
最近由Analysys所公布的一份研究指出，WiMax廠商要把這項技術賣給行動電信業者將會面臨很大的挑戰，因為業者目前已有3G強化技術(如HSDPA)的選擇。研究表示，WiMax Forum必需釐清行動版的功能和角色，才可能讓電信業者認真考慮。
目前，這項技術要成功還早得很，產品八字都還沒一撇，市場對WiMax的吹捧遠大於實際。也因此WiMax支持者必須設計出一套商業案例讓寬頻業者有參考範例，同時並取得行動電信業者的投入。如果做不到，那麼WiMax終將退縮至「最後一哩」（last-mile）上網技術的冷門區域，例如偏遠地區的寬頻上網，而無法成為大規模都會寬頻上網的重量級技術。
WiMax似乎已經變成一種無所不能的技術：它是DSL及纜線數據上網的替代方案；當作熱點技術更大更好用；它是偏遠地區的寬頻上網救星；甚至還可能是3G的殺手。
這些神話可說源起於英特爾對這項技術的鼎力支持。英特爾的行銷機制已經將行動電話對固網電話的影響拿來比喻WiMax預期對DSL及纜線上網的影響。以英特爾先前為了Wi-Fi而大力推動Centrino的力度來看，要推展WiMax自然絕非難事。
WiMax在發展的早期階段裡所將面臨的問題可能在於，一頭熱的廠商們對這個技術的看法都各取所需，而沒有辦法為它的最佳應用提出一個明確的訊息。所推動的應用過於紛歧──從行動寬頻到無線高速通訊，甚至偏遠地區的寬頻上網──這絕對把WiMax說得太偉大了。
WiMax必需與它的競爭技術放在一起來看──在廣域（wide area）方面先前已有許多無線固網技術存在，例如LMDS及MMDS。Wi-Fi的出現是要彌補區域網路（LAN）與藍芽（Bluetooth）之間的空隙。如果你想要行動性，現在全世界已經都在行動基地台的覆蓋之下了。
那WiMax的位子到底在哪裡？
WiMax其實是以IEEE 802.16標準的技術為基礎所創造出來的一個行銷名字。這項技術的發展原本是要支援10至66GHz頻段之間一對多的寬頻無線上網。這種技術有許多種部署，可以支援標準的無線固網寬頻到手機上的行動數據等各種不同應用。
它的主要目的是要用在都會網路上。當然，這種技術用在戶外寬頻上絕對比Wi-Fi更適合。例如，一台WiMax網路基地台，其覆蓋範圍可達到3公里之大。
就像其他技術一樣，WiMax也有一個專門組織在管理，讓原本就夠亂的情況更加混淆。WiMax Forum(WiMax論壇)組織正在為固接、漫遊、可攜式裝置，甚至還有無線寬頻上網開發新的標準（不需要直線對準基地台就可連線）。該組織表示這項技術可以為固接及可攜式裝置提供每個頻道40Mbps的傳輸率；而行動裝置可達15Mbps，後者至少要到2007年才有實現的希望。
雖然有英特爾的力挺，讓WiMax可以在眾多的無線技術中脫穎而出，但這並無法保證這項技術的成功。英特爾過去對於未來技術的眼光，也不是沒有看錯的記錄。在加入Wi-Fi行列之前，英特爾還是HomeRF(已壽終正寢)技術的大護法，後來轉而支持Wi-Fi可說引起市場一陣嘩然。
部份媒體過度「膨風」對WiMax來說也是個警訊。當Radioactive連絡WiMax Forum時，一位董事會成員告訴我們，很多過度吹噓的說法都是來自新創公司：「70Mbps的速度根本是亂講。」他表示，「1至10還比較差不多。」
英特爾可能比較喜歡大家為WiMax敲鑼打鼓，但其他的科技大廠則相當保留。例如，思科（Cisco）的技術長Charles Giancarlo最近就對這項技術潑了冷水，主要的原因是該技術的應用已經在3G行動網路的範圍內──在WiMax要進入市場時可能全球都在使用3G 了。
WiMax要找到焦點並成熟化，還有待業界的廣泛支持──不只是那些開發這項技術標準的廠商，還有那些敵對技術的廠商。事實上，技術上的互補絕對比競爭來得好。例如，WiMax可能和Wi-Fi有很好的結合。WiMax可以用來把寬頻連到大樓，而Wi-Fi則提供大樓內的上網。利用內建了Wi-Fi上網功能的WiMax CPE標準很容易就做到這一點。
WiMax Forum正在建立互通性的認證程序，這一點也不令人意外，畢竟這裡面有許多人都是固接無線寬頻技術的業界老鳥，他們深知這塊市場過去一直缺少市場標準而滯礙難行。
WiMax論壇預計要在2005年6月成立西班牙的實驗室，並從9月開始做互通性的認證。該實驗室將做產品的互通性測試，同時也會為相容的產品發行標章。也就是說，第一款具有WiMax認證的產品將會在2005年底到2006年間上市。
但還是有部分電信營運商等不及標準出爐就先推出產品。例如，BT（英國電信）已經在蘇格蘭及北愛爾蘭部署了郊區的寬頻無線上網技術Alvarion。本身是WiMax董事會成員的BT宣稱，他們的技術將會與WiMax標準相容。
盡管媒體大力哄抬，我們假設有朝一日WiMax真的消聲匿跡了，這也不是第一個跳票的無線技術。這讓人回想到LMDS及MMDS等固接的無線寬頻技術的命運，這些WiMax前輩技術的頻譜競標後來都以失敗告終。缺乏標準化意味著網路設備會很昂貴，且業者也擔心所支持的技術到頭來竟是大而無用，這也是為何電信業者不急著跟進的主因。
WiMax Forum必須確保這項技術能夠吸引電信業者利用它來提供行動數據服務。WiMax已經讓部分現有技術廠商感到傷腦筋，特別是3G設備製造商。
最近由Analysys所公布的一份研究指出，WiMax廠商要把這項技術賣給行動電信業者將會面臨很大的挑戰，因為業者目前已有3G強化技術(如HSDPA)的選擇。研究表示，WiMax Forum必需釐清行動版的功能和角色，才可能讓電信業者認真考慮。
目前，這項技術要成功還早得很，產品八字都還沒一撇，市場對WiMax的吹捧遠大於實際。也因此WiMax支持者必須設計出一套商業案例讓寬頻業者有參考範例，同時並取得行動電信業者的投入。如果做不到，那麼WiMax終將退縮至「最後一哩」（last-mile）上網技術的冷門區域，例如偏遠地區的寬頻上網，而無法成為大規模都會寬頻上網的重量級技術。
Sunday, January 09, 2005
評選25大科技發明
評選25大科技發明 第一名是…
尹德瀚/綜合報導
二十五年前，沒有人想到連著電線的電話和笨重的電腦能隨身攜帶，如今手機和筆記型電腦都已經成為很多人隨身不可或缺的物品，或許正因如此，在一群科技領袖評選出的廿五年來的廿五大科技發明中，手機和筆記型電腦分別列名第二和第七。
美國有線電視新聞網（ＣＮＮ）八日報導，這群科技領袖係應美國學術單位Lemelson-MitProgram之邀，就過去四分之一世紀中與醫療無關的科技選出二十五項創新和發明，評選標準強調要是從一九八○年之後逐漸被人廣泛使用，對日常生活產生直接且能感受得到影響。
入選名單的前十名多半與日常生活息息相關，包括第二名的手機，第三名的桌上型個人電腦，第五名的E-mail，第六名的全球定位系統，第七名的筆記型電腦，第八名的ＣＤ，第九名的數位相機。
其他重要發明還有十四名的自動櫃員機，十六名個人數位助理（ＰＤＡ），十八名電漿電視，十九名高解析度電視，二十三名語音信箱，汽車上的安全氣囊列名第十三。
有些發明我們不一定直接接觸，但它們是許多產品的基礎，例如鋪設在地面下的光纖（第四名），提供手機電力的鎳鋅電池和鋰電池（十五名），使數位相機得以存在的快閃記憶（二十二名）和有機發光二極管（OLEDS ），以及安全氣囊使用到的奈米科技（二十一名）和微機電系統（MENS，十一名）。其他入選的發明包括未來將取代條碼的射頻識別標籤（第十名），對刑事鑑識功不可沒的ＤＮＡ辨識（十二名），使用較少汽油的混合式汽車（hybridcar，十六名），太空梭（二十名），先進助聽裝置（二十四名），以及無線寬頻技術（WIFI）。
至於第一名是那一種發明，ＣＮＮ賣了一個關子，要在科技領袖日內選出後再公佈。
尹德瀚/綜合報導
二十五年前，沒有人想到連著電線的電話和笨重的電腦能隨身攜帶，如今手機和筆記型電腦都已經成為很多人隨身不可或缺的物品，或許正因如此，在一群科技領袖評選出的廿五年來的廿五大科技發明中，手機和筆記型電腦分別列名第二和第七。
美國有線電視新聞網（ＣＮＮ）八日報導，這群科技領袖係應美國學術單位Lemelson-MitProgram之邀，就過去四分之一世紀中與醫療無關的科技選出二十五項創新和發明，評選標準強調要是從一九八○年之後逐漸被人廣泛使用，對日常生活產生直接且能感受得到影響。
入選名單的前十名多半與日常生活息息相關，包括第二名的手機，第三名的桌上型個人電腦，第五名的E-mail，第六名的全球定位系統，第七名的筆記型電腦，第八名的ＣＤ，第九名的數位相機。
其他重要發明還有十四名的自動櫃員機，十六名個人數位助理（ＰＤＡ），十八名電漿電視，十九名高解析度電視，二十三名語音信箱，汽車上的安全氣囊列名第十三。
有些發明我們不一定直接接觸，但它們是許多產品的基礎，例如鋪設在地面下的光纖（第四名），提供手機電力的鎳鋅電池和鋰電池（十五名），使數位相機得以存在的快閃記憶（二十二名）和有機發光二極管（OLEDS ），以及安全氣囊使用到的奈米科技（二十一名）和微機電系統（MENS，十一名）。其他入選的發明包括未來將取代條碼的射頻識別標籤（第十名），對刑事鑑識功不可沒的ＤＮＡ辨識（十二名），使用較少汽油的混合式汽車（hybridcar，十六名），太空梭（二十名），先進助聽裝置（二十四名），以及無線寬頻技術（WIFI）。
至於第一名是那一種發明，ＣＮＮ賣了一個關子，要在科技領袖日內選出後再公佈。
Friday, January 07, 2005
未來電視機 碳做的
未來電視機 碳做的
■ 編譯吳國卿／綜合六日電
在煤或網球拍中找到碳並不稀奇，不過，幾年後你的電視機可能也是碳做的。數家公司正潛心開發一種以鑽石或碳奈米管為原料的新型平面顯示器。
研究人員希望以這兩種純碳作為呈現影像的媒介。理論上，這種「場效顯示器」（filed effective display, FED）耗用的電比電漿電視或液晶電視少，畫質更佳，且製造成本較低。FED的發展凸顯過去相當穩定的電視市場，正進行一場快速的變遷。
一度由少數幾家日本製造商掌控的電視市場，現在涵蓋了多樣的業者，包括戴爾（Dell）、惠普（HP）和西屋（Westinghouse）等公司。如果FED發展成功，將使本周在拉斯維加斯消費者電子展（CES）展出的眾多新款電視成為歷史。
休斯頓碳奈米科技公司（Carbon Nanotechnologies，CNI）行銷副總裁匹茲提克說：「奈米管電視的概念提供陰極射線管（CRT）的畫質，而且最好的畫質只有在CRT電視才找得到。所有大型顯示器製造商都在密切注視奈米管電視。」
三星電子公司已用CNI生產的奈米管，製造一面電視大小的顯示器原型。匹茲提克說，採用奈米管螢幕的電視2006年底會推出市面。
另一方面，先進奈米科技公司（Advance Nanotech）正與布里斯托大學（University of Bristol）合作開發添加特殊鑽石粉塵的類似面板。該公司希望在一年半到兩年內推出原型產品。
截至目前，支持這種技術的主要廠商有佳能公司（Canon）和東芝公司。兩家公司已成立合資事業，生產平面發光顯示器（SED），且東芝將在2006年生產大尺寸SED電視機。雖然佳能和東芝的SED規格類似FED，兩家公司卻使用一種不同於碳的分子。
新技術仍有障礙等著突破，延遲也是無可避免的事。原本有人看好奈米管電視會在2005年推出，但這個目標顯然還是夢想。既有的投資也是障礙， iSuppli公司顯示器研究部副總裁賽曼查說：「很難想像（奈米管技術）能在液晶顯示器投資瘋狂增加時打進這個市場，我們很難對它樂觀。」
Lux研究公司分析師諾丹預測，業者可能按兵不動，到2006年後才興建奈米管電視廠，並到2008年或2009年才量產。
【2005/01/07 經濟日報】
■ 編譯吳國卿／綜合六日電
在煤或網球拍中找到碳並不稀奇，不過，幾年後你的電視機可能也是碳做的。數家公司正潛心開發一種以鑽石或碳奈米管為原料的新型平面顯示器。
研究人員希望以這兩種純碳作為呈現影像的媒介。理論上，這種「場效顯示器」（filed effective display, FED）耗用的電比電漿電視或液晶電視少，畫質更佳，且製造成本較低。FED的發展凸顯過去相當穩定的電視市場，正進行一場快速的變遷。
一度由少數幾家日本製造商掌控的電視市場，現在涵蓋了多樣的業者，包括戴爾（Dell）、惠普（HP）和西屋（Westinghouse）等公司。如果FED發展成功，將使本周在拉斯維加斯消費者電子展（CES）展出的眾多新款電視成為歷史。
休斯頓碳奈米科技公司（Carbon Nanotechnologies，CNI）行銷副總裁匹茲提克說：「奈米管電視的概念提供陰極射線管（CRT）的畫質，而且最好的畫質只有在CRT電視才找得到。所有大型顯示器製造商都在密切注視奈米管電視。」
三星電子公司已用CNI生產的奈米管，製造一面電視大小的顯示器原型。匹茲提克說，採用奈米管螢幕的電視2006年底會推出市面。
另一方面，先進奈米科技公司（Advance Nanotech）正與布里斯托大學（University of Bristol）合作開發添加特殊鑽石粉塵的類似面板。該公司希望在一年半到兩年內推出原型產品。
截至目前，支持這種技術的主要廠商有佳能公司（Canon）和東芝公司。兩家公司已成立合資事業，生產平面發光顯示器（SED），且東芝將在2006年生產大尺寸SED電視機。雖然佳能和東芝的SED規格類似FED，兩家公司卻使用一種不同於碳的分子。
新技術仍有障礙等著突破，延遲也是無可避免的事。原本有人看好奈米管電視會在2005年推出，但這個目標顯然還是夢想。既有的投資也是障礙， iSuppli公司顯示器研究部副總裁賽曼查說：「很難想像（奈米管技術）能在液晶顯示器投資瘋狂增加時打進這個市場，我們很難對它樂觀。」
Lux研究公司分析師諾丹預測，業者可能按兵不動，到2006年後才興建奈米管電視廠，並到2008年或2009年才量產。
【2005/01/07 經濟日報】
Wednesday, January 05, 2005
The Future's Here: Welcome to the Next Generation of Converging Technology
The Future's Here: Welcome to the Next Generation of Converging Technology
A widescreen television as large as a wall, a mobile phone that receives live broadcasts in a moving vehicle and an apartment that will order fresh vegetables for its refrigerator - these are no longer half-imagined dreams of the future but impending realities.
Bigger and better visual displays, next-generation mobile communications and intelligent home networking are areas in which Korean companies have significant competitive edges.
"In the field of next-generation industrial developments, the competition is so intense that a single failure in terms of product development can change the position of who leads the business," said Professor Cho Dong-ho of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST).
◆ Displays
Next-generation displays break down into plasma display panels (PDPs), liquid crystal displays (LCDs), and organic light-emitting diodes (OLEDs), which are used on televisions, personal computers and mobile phone handsets.
Samsung SDI recently developed the world's largest 102-inch PDP. Samsung is planning to unveil an even larger set at the international Consumer Electronics Show (CES), the world's largest exhibition of electronics, which will be held in Las Vegas from Jan. 6 to 9.
Samsung SDI executive Bae Hong-kyu said that, "Korea was able to take the top position in the PDP industry thanks to the rapid development of larger products. However, Japanese companies such as Matsushita, which recently developed a 65-inch PDP, are close behind. We always have to stay focused."
In the market for LCDs, which are mainly used as PC monitors, Samsung and LG Philips have assumed first and second place respectively. Nevertheless, Japanese firm Sharp is catching up rapidly with the development of a 65-inch LCD screen, which is eight inches larger than Samsung's biggest output.
OLEDs are gaining in popularity given the product's paper-thin compactness and high resolution. Samsung SDI, Japan's Pioneer, and Light Display in Taiwan are weighing in as contenders for the top three spots. Currently, OLEDs have limited use and are mostly restricted to small displays such as the ones found on mobile phones. Firms that find a way of successfully enlarging the products are expected to win out in this market.
◆Next-generation mobile communications
Next-generation mobile communications technology will enable the high-speed transfer of data while on the move. Samsung electronics, the Korean mobile-phone manufacturer that has become a household name around the world, ranks second now in terms of handset sales to Scandinavian firm Nokia. However, in the arena of technological breakthroughs, Samsung has stolen the lead.
Mobile phones have developed features such as text messaging, wireless Internet, camera phones, MP3 players, recreational software and multi-player games, PDA service, camcorder and health-measuring functions.
This year, broadcasting and video phone calling will be added to the list. The rate at which data can be transferred from a portable perspective has also grown, and the fully portable Internet service Wireless Broadband (Wibro) will soon be introduced to the market. The advent of Wibro will also give related businesses such as Telematics - a technology that lets users transfer information while driving - a significant boost.
◆Intelligent home network
With home networking, people will be able to turn off their television sets or gas ovens from halfway across town - as their telephone transforms into a long-distance remote control.
While the technology remains at an embryonic or nursery stage in many countries, in Korea, LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics have already introduced it to the market by installing home networking systems to 25,000 apartments in Seoul and Daegu.
"In ten years' time you will be able to monitor everything that is happening in your house, and services such as basic medical examinations and shopping will be available from the comfort of your own home," said Park Hyun of LG Electronics.
url: http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501050023.html
Copyright (c)2003 DIGITAL CHOSUN All rights reserved.
Contact letters@chosun.com for more information.
Privacy Statement Contact privacy@chosun.com
A widescreen television as large as a wall, a mobile phone that receives live broadcasts in a moving vehicle and an apartment that will order fresh vegetables for its refrigerator - these are no longer half-imagined dreams of the future but impending realities.
Bigger and better visual displays, next-generation mobile communications and intelligent home networking are areas in which Korean companies have significant competitive edges.
"In the field of next-generation industrial developments, the competition is so intense that a single failure in terms of product development can change the position of who leads the business," said Professor Cho Dong-ho of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST).
◆ Displays
Next-generation displays break down into plasma display panels (PDPs), liquid crystal displays (LCDs), and organic light-emitting diodes (OLEDs), which are used on televisions, personal computers and mobile phone handsets.
Samsung SDI recently developed the world's largest 102-inch PDP. Samsung is planning to unveil an even larger set at the international Consumer Electronics Show (CES), the world's largest exhibition of electronics, which will be held in Las Vegas from Jan. 6 to 9.
Samsung SDI executive Bae Hong-kyu said that, "Korea was able to take the top position in the PDP industry thanks to the rapid development of larger products. However, Japanese companies such as Matsushita, which recently developed a 65-inch PDP, are close behind. We always have to stay focused."
In the market for LCDs, which are mainly used as PC monitors, Samsung and LG Philips have assumed first and second place respectively. Nevertheless, Japanese firm Sharp is catching up rapidly with the development of a 65-inch LCD screen, which is eight inches larger than Samsung's biggest output.
OLEDs are gaining in popularity given the product's paper-thin compactness and high resolution. Samsung SDI, Japan's Pioneer, and Light Display in Taiwan are weighing in as contenders for the top three spots. Currently, OLEDs have limited use and are mostly restricted to small displays such as the ones found on mobile phones. Firms that find a way of successfully enlarging the products are expected to win out in this market.
◆Next-generation mobile communications
Next-generation mobile communications technology will enable the high-speed transfer of data while on the move. Samsung electronics, the Korean mobile-phone manufacturer that has become a household name around the world, ranks second now in terms of handset sales to Scandinavian firm Nokia. However, in the arena of technological breakthroughs, Samsung has stolen the lead.
Mobile phones have developed features such as text messaging, wireless Internet, camera phones, MP3 players, recreational software and multi-player games, PDA service, camcorder and health-measuring functions.
This year, broadcasting and video phone calling will be added to the list. The rate at which data can be transferred from a portable perspective has also grown, and the fully portable Internet service Wireless Broadband (Wibro) will soon be introduced to the market. The advent of Wibro will also give related businesses such as Telematics - a technology that lets users transfer information while driving - a significant boost.
◆Intelligent home network
With home networking, people will be able to turn off their television sets or gas ovens from halfway across town - as their telephone transforms into a long-distance remote control.
While the technology remains at an embryonic or nursery stage in many countries, in Korea, LG Electronics and Samsung Electronics have already introduced it to the market by installing home networking systems to 25,000 apartments in Seoul and Daegu.
"In ten years' time you will be able to monitor everything that is happening in your house, and services such as basic medical examinations and shopping will be available from the comfort of your own home," said Park Hyun of LG Electronics.
url: http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501050023.html
Copyright (c)2003 DIGITAL CHOSUN All rights reserved.
Contact letters@chosun.com for more information.
Privacy Statement Contact privacy@chosun.com
Sunday, January 02, 2005
日韓加碼OLED投資 朝大尺寸發展
2005.01.01 工商時報
日韓加碼OLED投資 朝大尺寸發展
徐仁全/新竹報導
在國內廠商光磊突然裁了大半的OLED部門員工之後，讓外界對有機電激發光顯示器（OLED）產業前景產生些疑慮。不過，從日韓等廠商大舉加碼、投入量產的情勢來看，OLED應用仍是可期。而台灣廠商除了搶攻手機次面板市場外，更要佈局研發中大尺寸面板，才不致輸了下一輪戰局。
OLED量產商品化不超過三年，台灣廠商也在這幾年間投入研發量產行列，從早期的十多家廠商到現在的五、六家，中間雖有人打退堂鼓，但現有的錸寶、悠景、東元激光及聯宗光電，及面板廠商友達、奇美、華映及統寶等仍可支撐台灣OLED產業，不致讓日韓業者專美於前。
錸寶去年出貨量已經可達到八百萬片，在第三季時的出貨量已達到全球的三成，較前年全年平均二成六要高出許多，也說明日本先鋒、南韓三星及台灣錸寶仍是全球OLED的主要出貨廠商。而悠景是後起之秀，每月出貨量也在二十餘萬片的水準。
只是，現在OLED的應用還是太小，只有手機次面板及最近掀起的Mp3風潮。依Displaysearch預估，二○○四年全球OLED出貨也不過三千五百萬片，前三大廠出貨即可佔到八成，剩下的就由二線廠去搶食，也才會發生光磊客戶不多，養不起龐大的設備及人事經費。
不過，從日本及韓國積極投入OLED，南韓三星及LP皆表示要擴充OLED生產線，日本除了先鋒已量產了，日前東芝也表示要投入量產、再加上京瓷、新力、三洋等大廠皆加入此行列後，在日本更掀起一陣OLED熱潮，與台灣投資轉冷的情形剛好相反。
日本廠商的態度是，TFT-LCD既然已讓台灣業者超越了日本，在OLED這項新技術上是不能再失去城池了。所以，大廠紛紛投入OLED的研發，並且朝中大尺寸去發展，跳過小尺寸的市場應用。
對台灣廠商來說，日本業者避開小尺寸雖是短多，但估計二到三年後，中大尺寸技術成熟，日本就可重返OLED市場主流，拿回顯示器大國的頭銜。這樣的如意算盤不知會否實踐？但台灣廠商一直在小尺寸上打轉，疏於中大尺寸的佈局及研發，那就危險了。雖說現在小尺寸市場看得到台灣廠商的市占率，但下一輪中大尺寸戰場，則會有被淘汰的危險。
台灣廠商應把握在TFT-LCD及LTPS上的優勢，趕緊投入主動式全彩OLED的技術，大型面板廠與專業的OLED廠一起合作，投入中大尺寸面板製造，始才能確保台灣OLED產業在下一回合仍有立足之地。
日韓加碼OLED投資 朝大尺寸發展
徐仁全/新竹報導
在國內廠商光磊突然裁了大半的OLED部門員工之後，讓外界對有機電激發光顯示器（OLED）產業前景產生些疑慮。不過，從日韓等廠商大舉加碼、投入量產的情勢來看，OLED應用仍是可期。而台灣廠商除了搶攻手機次面板市場外，更要佈局研發中大尺寸面板，才不致輸了下一輪戰局。
OLED量產商品化不超過三年，台灣廠商也在這幾年間投入研發量產行列，從早期的十多家廠商到現在的五、六家，中間雖有人打退堂鼓，但現有的錸寶、悠景、東元激光及聯宗光電，及面板廠商友達、奇美、華映及統寶等仍可支撐台灣OLED產業，不致讓日韓業者專美於前。
錸寶去年出貨量已經可達到八百萬片，在第三季時的出貨量已達到全球的三成，較前年全年平均二成六要高出許多，也說明日本先鋒、南韓三星及台灣錸寶仍是全球OLED的主要出貨廠商。而悠景是後起之秀，每月出貨量也在二十餘萬片的水準。
只是，現在OLED的應用還是太小，只有手機次面板及最近掀起的Mp3風潮。依Displaysearch預估，二○○四年全球OLED出貨也不過三千五百萬片，前三大廠出貨即可佔到八成，剩下的就由二線廠去搶食，也才會發生光磊客戶不多，養不起龐大的設備及人事經費。
不過，從日本及韓國積極投入OLED，南韓三星及LP皆表示要擴充OLED生產線，日本除了先鋒已量產了，日前東芝也表示要投入量產、再加上京瓷、新力、三洋等大廠皆加入此行列後，在日本更掀起一陣OLED熱潮，與台灣投資轉冷的情形剛好相反。
日本廠商的態度是，TFT-LCD既然已讓台灣業者超越了日本，在OLED這項新技術上是不能再失去城池了。所以，大廠紛紛投入OLED的研發，並且朝中大尺寸去發展，跳過小尺寸的市場應用。
對台灣廠商來說，日本業者避開小尺寸雖是短多，但估計二到三年後，中大尺寸技術成熟，日本就可重返OLED市場主流，拿回顯示器大國的頭銜。這樣的如意算盤不知會否實踐？但台灣廠商一直在小尺寸上打轉，疏於中大尺寸的佈局及研發，那就危險了。雖說現在小尺寸市場看得到台灣廠商的市占率，但下一輪中大尺寸戰場，則會有被淘汰的危險。
台灣廠商應把握在TFT-LCD及LTPS上的優勢，趕緊投入主動式全彩OLED的技術，大型面板廠與專業的OLED廠一起合作，投入中大尺寸面板製造，始才能確保台灣OLED產業在下一回合仍有立足之地。
Forbes.com: NTT DoCoMo, Vodafone, Alcatel, Siemens to build 'Super 3G' technology - report
NTT DoCoMo, Vodafone, Alcatel, Siemens to build 'Super 3G' technology - report
AFX News Limited
TOKYO, Dec 31, 2004 (AFX-Europe via COMTEX) -- The world's 26 major mobile phone operators and telecommunication equipment-makers have agreed to work on a global standard for a super fast mobile transmission technology, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun business daily reported, without quoting sources.
The group includes NTT DoCoMo and NEC of Japan, Britain's Vodafone Group PLC, US cellphone carrier Cingular Wireless, Alcatel of France and Siemens AG of Germany, the newspaper said.
Using the new technology called Super 3G, the group plans to launch by 2009 global services for transmitting large volumes of moving images by mobile phones at a speed 10 times faster than the current 3G (third-generation) technology, the report said.
Super 3G can boost mobile transmission speeds to a range of 30 to 100 megabits per second to match existing land line fiber optic telecom technology, allowing movies, games or home videos to be played on handsets with a much higher resolution, it said.
The report said the cost of upgrading the mobile telecommunication network for Super 3G in Japan may top 100 bln yen (975 mln usd).
The report could not be confirmed by Vodafone's Japan unit, NTT DoCoMo Inc, or NEC Corp.
mxs/sct/hcw/jlw
Copyright 2004. AFX News Ltd. All rights reserved.
Super 3G 26家業者將統一標準
【2005/01/01 經濟日報】
AFX News Limited
TOKYO, Dec 31, 2004 (AFX-Europe via COMTEX) -- The world's 26 major mobile phone operators and telecommunication equipment-makers have agreed to work on a global standard for a super fast mobile transmission technology, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun business daily reported, without quoting sources.
The group includes NTT DoCoMo and NEC of Japan, Britain's Vodafone Group PLC, US cellphone carrier Cingular Wireless, Alcatel of France and Siemens AG of Germany, the newspaper said.
Using the new technology called Super 3G, the group plans to launch by 2009 global services for transmitting large volumes of moving images by mobile phones at a speed 10 times faster than the current 3G (third-generation) technology, the report said.
Super 3G can boost mobile transmission speeds to a range of 30 to 100 megabits per second to match existing land line fiber optic telecom technology, allowing movies, games or home videos to be played on handsets with a much higher resolution, it said.
The report said the cost of upgrading the mobile telecommunication network for Super 3G in Japan may top 100 bln yen (975 mln usd).
The report could not be confirmed by Vodafone's Japan unit, NTT DoCoMo Inc, or NEC Corp.
mxs/sct/hcw/jlw
Copyright 2004. AFX News Ltd. All rights reserved.
Super 3G 26家業者將統一標準
【編譯吳國卿／道瓊社東京31日電】
日本經濟新聞31日報導，亞洲、美國和歐洲的26家行動電話服務商與資料傳輸設備製造商，已經同意統一下一代行動電話技術的標準，以期使高速傳輸高畫質影像的夢想能夠早日實現。
傳輸高畫質影像的服務最快在2009年將可在全球各地推出，這項取名為超級第三代行動電話（Super 3G）的技術，將提供每秒30個到100個百萬位元（Mb）的傳輸速度，10倍於目前在日本已逐漸普及的3G服務。
已簽約的公司包括著名的行動電話服務商，如日本的NTT移動通信網（NTT DoCoMo）、英國的伏得風集團、美國的Cingular無線公司，和中國大陸的中國移動通信公司；以及資料傳輸設備製造商，如NEC公司、法國阿爾卡 特公司（Alcatel）和德國西門子公司。
各家公司將自2007年6月起採用新規格，並開始商業營運擬議的服務，和開發設備。
超級3G行動電話服務也會使即時傳送高畫質影像成為可能，這項升級預料將激勵廠商開發較大螢幕的手機，以供手機使用者利用拍照、玩遊戲和觀賞電影等功能。
統一標準也將有助於行動電話服務商提高跨系統的電話連線品質，顧客也可使用不同國家提供的共同服務。
由於手機規格也會統一，設備製造商將可藉大規模生產來降低成本。
NTT移動通信網正和製造商合作研發必要的資料傳輸設備，以便提供高速傳輸服務。
該公司計畫最快2009年會在日本提供這類服務，估計在基地台升級和其他方面的投資高達1,000億日圓。
簽約的公司也致力於使傳輸速度更快的第四代行動電話（4G）商業化，但這項技術將使用不同的頻譜，且開發設備需要較長時間。【2005/01/01 經濟日報】
Saturday, January 01, 2005
看3c異想成真
【聯合新聞網 記者吳貞瑩、廖敏如、李若松／專題報導】
電視軟體帶動硬體趨勢
廣 告
2004年台灣五家無線電視台只有15個數位電視頻道，2005年擴充為30個頻道，並擁有行動電視的優勢，將有助帶動成長，更多電視或電腦主機會附加數位電視接收功能。
一機擁有多功能
迷你電腦、數位相機、數位攝影機、MP3隨身聽、錄音筆、多媒體播放器、手機(新聞、網站、商品)等，好像是八竿子打不著的電子產品，2005年會排列組合成「多合一產品」，共用記憶卡(網站、商品)也許三種功能只收兩種功能費用，而記憶卡容量繼續向上衝，價格向下跌。
掌上型遊樂器開打
任天堂2004年底推出上下螢幕創新玩法的NDS掌上型遊樂器；另外，NDS有即時文字通訊功能，讓附近玩家可以寫字、畫圖隨時溝通，加上可支援原有GBA遊戲，代理商一引進台灣就被搶購一空。
新力電腦娛樂，2004年底在日本推出旗下首款掌上型遊樂器PSP，除了有號稱媲美PS2遊戲內容，還可在遊樂器上播放電影、聽音樂等，售價折台幣約19,800元；今年2月台北電玩展會正式在台搶先曝光，台灣專用機種預定春天正式上市。
次世代電視遊樂器再起
2004年Xbox、PS2大打網路連線遊戲戰爭後，2005年全球最大電玩展E3展中，微軟、任天堂等新一代遊戲主機包括Xbox2、Revolution都可望亮相，讓玩家體驗更不一樣的遊戲內容。
病毒駭客威脅手機
2004年除了線上遊戲、網路或是個人電腦，已出現手機惡作劇病毒，資訊廠商預測，手機得做好掃毒、防護等措施，將是2005的新趨勢。
線上付費享受娛樂
雖然MP3未授權下載、P2P音樂交換問題仍未解決，但不少廠商仍投入不易被盜取的隨選影音播放，使線上付費影音娛樂逐漸展開。HiNet旗下 HiChannel就推出電影、戲劇等節目，隨時可看的優勢，每月營業額突破千萬元；KKBOX也與HiNet合作，提供超過50萬首合法授權音樂，月費不到150元。
手機更注重娛樂效果
2005手機的娛樂取向，將因應3G(新聞、網站)的營運，更有聲有色。2004年底已有南韓手機作先驅，除了MP3成為必備功能，innostream的i3000手機可以連接喇叭，外放MP3音樂，就像iPOD一樣。
此外，2005年將會有相對應的雙網手機出現。好處是手機在麥當勞、咖啡店等無線上網的熱點時，改以近一分鐘一元的價格收費，也可改用Skype等打網路電話更省錢；其他則可使用行動上網。
數位家庭與資訊娛樂化
英特爾、微軟、hp、TOSHIBA等國際廠商積極推動數位家庭與影音電腦，隨寬頻與無線網路快速發展，加上中央處理器效能發展越來越強大，未來電腦將可望成為家庭娛樂中心。
滑蓋造形出頭天
棒棒糖型的（Candy bar）、摺疊的、扭的、轉的……手機設計就像在玩魔術方塊，2005年預料會有滑蓋新潮流。
滑蓋手機崛起是前年底的事，南韓三星接連推出多款，最近一款E808縮小到女生手掌心大小；西門子已經熱賣的SL65，最近將會有名牌ESCADA加持，續推精品版；就連諾基亞，也透露將推出新造形滑蓋手機，看來滑蓋機將會男女通吃。
手機加噱頭絕倒你
西門子去年研發出一種晶片，只要搭配不同感應器，手機就可以搖身一變，有醫療、保全功能，西門子去年就曾模擬做出口臭機，為「口氣」把關，可惜未量產。韓機PANTECH去年推出指紋機、體溫機，用戶分別必須按指紋才能開啟功能，以及測量體溫，這些功能都是靠感應晶片辦到的。2005會出現什麼有趣的附加功能？想像一下吧！
網路電話便宜哈啦
入口網站如PChome、蕃薯藤與網路服務業者如Seednet等紛紛投入網路電話業務，標榜每月平均省下三成電話費，光是PChome Skype下載人次就突破200萬次。各業者都提供如USB電話或提供閘道器，直接連結個人電腦與家中電話等，可像傳統電話撥號；未來只要有無線服務的地方，還可用手機中的網路電話軟體撥打通話，更省錢
Friday, December 31, 2004
台灣顯示器產業的下一步
光電小組執行秘書石大成
台灣顯示器產業的下一步 現行競爭策略與未來技術前景
（記者邵琮淳／台北） 2004/12/31
經濟規模與品牌是台灣面板廠目前的競爭瓶頸
未來台灣TFT LCD面板的產業發展有幾點值得注意；從經營面看，將是「經濟規模」與「品牌」的競爭，這從日、韓發展即可看出端倪。一般而言，若無持續擴大生產規模因應生產效益及成本競爭力，便會面臨合併或競爭力下滑的挑戰。如早期日本東芝（Toshiba）及松下（Matsushita），2004年的愛普生（EPSON）及三洋（SANYO）合併液晶事業部門，日立（Hitachi）與松下、東芝成立新公司合建六代廠等，都說明「經濟規模」將是未來一項非常重要的競爭關鍵因素。
另外在「品牌」競爭，我們知道面板將來是因應電視及家電需求，電視市場是未來面板市場能否持續成長的關鍵。而消費者使用特定電視品牌的習慣根深蒂固，不同於IT產品應用著重價格，日本電視機廠商紛尋求可掌握且穩定的電視面板來源，所以SONY和三星（Samsung）合建七代面板廠，日立與松下、東芝合建六代廠，他們為何這麼做，關鍵還是在維持電視市場中的「品牌價值」，不讓品牌價值陷於與IT產品一樣，淪落到只剩下成本的競爭。
在以往的IT產業中，台灣廠商最擅長以經濟規模來降低生產成本，以大量產出來創造利潤，但成本下降終有盡頭，當無法維持適當毛利時，產業將開始外移。但這僅適用於IT產業，一旦到了必須結合品牌發展的電視產業生態，在發展策略上就要有些變革才行。
強化與IT廠合作或購買品牌都是可以考慮的方式
品牌發展一向非台灣廠商擅長，在IT產業雖有acer、BenQ投入不少資金發展，但與日本SONY、東芝等家電業廠商比較，我們還有很大的發展空間。台灣面板廠要突破未來的困境，還是須從品牌著手，未必得自己花錢發展品牌，除與全球知名電視品牌廠商維持良好關係外，更可利用台商與IT產業知名品牌建立密切合作關係，積極協助IT廠商進入電視市場，想辦法打破電視品牌以日韓為主的生態，如此面板廠商才能與IT廠商攜手闖出一片天。
另外，比較直接的方式，就是與知名品牌結合因應未來「經濟規模」與「品牌」競爭，如早期的韓國LG與荷蘭的飛利浦（Philips），飛利浦是歐洲、非洲及中東地區最知名的品牌；鴻海多年前收購美國最大的知名連接器公司，近期則有TCL與法國知名家電Thomson結合、聯想收購IBM PC部門的策略模式。不過收購品牌並不是為了品牌而品牌，台灣面板廠缺的並不是產能，而是品牌帶來的訂單、行銷及商譽。
此外，在技術發展與製造生產上，TFT LCD雖已是成熟技術，但是成熟的技術並不表示是最好的技術，因此未來如果有一個更好、更簡單的顯示技術成功，TFT會面臨新的競爭。所以，TFT LCD面板廠應該持續在製造流程上加以創新與簡化，以維持競爭力。
投資腳步上 台面板廠做好follower角色即可
也許TFT LCD投資的資本相對於其他產業是非常大的，六代以上的TFT LCD生產線投資金額已不亞於12吋晶圓廠，但就整個TFT LCD的應用來說，未來都還有非常高的發展潛力，韓國和日本廠商的積極投資策略，也促使台灣廠商不得不積極面對。就台灣廠商在次世代的投資而言，現階段必須要做一個非常好的跟隨者（follower）角色，在產能擴充腳步上也許可放慢速度，但在新世代生產線的投資進度上是不容延遲的，若在次世代生產線的投資被韓國和日本拉開差距，未來將很難再追上去。由於新世代生產線投資金額越來越大，借錢的銀行、創投等投資人，將會選擇有競爭力的廠商來進行投資，所以競爭力較弱的廠商將由市場決定去留。
OLED可望成為下一個交棒的顯示技術
就全球平面顯示器市場分佈而言，目前重心主要集中在TFT LCD；就市場規模而言，約佔了全球平面顯示器市場規模7成以上。在電槳顯示器（PDP）領域，日韓廠商最近開始傾全力發展PDP產業，主要是看好電漿電視（PDP TV）能在大尺寸電視機市場，特別是40吋以上的電視機市場，在這1～2年內也許要比液晶電視（LCD TV）具成本優勢，但未來透過達到經濟規模的生產效率、液晶電視規格標準化的制定及更有效率且完整的市場供應鏈，電漿電視將受到液晶電視的挑戰。
全球PDP產值在2004年約佔全球平面顯示器的比重約7.6％，隨日韓廠商大幅擴充產能，據光電科技工業協進會（PIDA）推估到2007年將可佔全球平面顯示器的比重約13.0％，成長力非常驚人。在TN／STN方面，雖在全球平面顯示器的市場規模比重逐漸下降，但是在一些較低階產品的應用方面， TN／STN還是有其存在的價值。
被視為下一波顯示技術的明星—有機電激發光顯示器（OLED），在技術及材料瓶頸逐漸突破後，2005年主動式OLED將重新在市場出現，在色彩及穩定度表現將有機會擄獲許多消費者的心，不過在 2～3年內，主動式的OLED面板，在價格上可能還無法跟TFT LCD及彩色STN面板價格匹配。
而微型顯示器方面，目前主要應用在背投影電視，在SONY／EPSON的高溫多晶矽（HTPS）技術和儀器（TI）的DMD技術的挾擊下，反射式矽基液晶（LCoS）能激發出多少市場火花，將是未來技術消長的觀察重點。背投影電視、液晶電視及電漿電視最大差異在於背投影電視未來將生產更大尺寸電視，不需再作新世代生產線的投資，在成本優勢上將是其他兩者無法比擬的地方。
關於平面發射顯示器（Surface-Conduction Electron-Emitter Display；SED）技術，由於還在發展階段，它的發光原理較類似場發射顯示器（FED），目前投入廠商不多，主要是以Canon及東芝共同開發的 36吋SED 為最佳，FED過去在美國有許多廠商投入，不但後來都失敗了，Canon和東芝若能在2～3年內把SED做起來，應可佔有部分市場，否則可能沒機會了。
但是任何一門顯示技術，越多廠商、越多研究機構投入，未來成功的機率越高，若一定要我選擇的話，OLED應是繼TFT LCD後最有希望接棒的顯示技術，未來10年內不僅只有在中小尺寸看得到OLED，在大尺寸應該也沒問題，可撓式顯示技術（Flexible display）也會有OLED的影子。其實各種顯示技術都將在市場上找到最適當的定位，短期內還不至於會消失，只會消長而已。（國科會光電小組執行秘書石大成口述，邵琮淳整理）
台灣顯示器產業的下一步 現行競爭策略與未來技術前景
（記者邵琮淳／台北） 2004/12/31
經濟規模與品牌是台灣面板廠目前的競爭瓶頸
未來台灣TFT LCD面板的產業發展有幾點值得注意；從經營面看，將是「經濟規模」與「品牌」的競爭，這從日、韓發展即可看出端倪。一般而言，若無持續擴大生產規模因應生產效益及成本競爭力，便會面臨合併或競爭力下滑的挑戰。如早期日本東芝（Toshiba）及松下（Matsushita），2004年的愛普生（EPSON）及三洋（SANYO）合併液晶事業部門，日立（Hitachi）與松下、東芝成立新公司合建六代廠等，都說明「經濟規模」將是未來一項非常重要的競爭關鍵因素。
另外在「品牌」競爭，我們知道面板將來是因應電視及家電需求，電視市場是未來面板市場能否持續成長的關鍵。而消費者使用特定電視品牌的習慣根深蒂固，不同於IT產品應用著重價格，日本電視機廠商紛尋求可掌握且穩定的電視面板來源，所以SONY和三星（Samsung）合建七代面板廠，日立與松下、東芝合建六代廠，他們為何這麼做，關鍵還是在維持電視市場中的「品牌價值」，不讓品牌價值陷於與IT產品一樣，淪落到只剩下成本的競爭。
在以往的IT產業中，台灣廠商最擅長以經濟規模來降低生產成本，以大量產出來創造利潤，但成本下降終有盡頭，當無法維持適當毛利時，產業將開始外移。但這僅適用於IT產業，一旦到了必須結合品牌發展的電視產業生態，在發展策略上就要有些變革才行。
強化與IT廠合作或購買品牌都是可以考慮的方式
品牌發展一向非台灣廠商擅長，在IT產業雖有acer、BenQ投入不少資金發展，但與日本SONY、東芝等家電業廠商比較，我們還有很大的發展空間。台灣面板廠要突破未來的困境，還是須從品牌著手，未必得自己花錢發展品牌，除與全球知名電視品牌廠商維持良好關係外，更可利用台商與IT產業知名品牌建立密切合作關係，積極協助IT廠商進入電視市場，想辦法打破電視品牌以日韓為主的生態，如此面板廠商才能與IT廠商攜手闖出一片天。
另外，比較直接的方式，就是與知名品牌結合因應未來「經濟規模」與「品牌」競爭，如早期的韓國LG與荷蘭的飛利浦（Philips），飛利浦是歐洲、非洲及中東地區最知名的品牌；鴻海多年前收購美國最大的知名連接器公司，近期則有TCL與法國知名家電Thomson結合、聯想收購IBM PC部門的策略模式。不過收購品牌並不是為了品牌而品牌，台灣面板廠缺的並不是產能，而是品牌帶來的訂單、行銷及商譽。
此外，在技術發展與製造生產上，TFT LCD雖已是成熟技術，但是成熟的技術並不表示是最好的技術，因此未來如果有一個更好、更簡單的顯示技術成功，TFT會面臨新的競爭。所以，TFT LCD面板廠應該持續在製造流程上加以創新與簡化，以維持競爭力。
投資腳步上 台面板廠做好follower角色即可
也許TFT LCD投資的資本相對於其他產業是非常大的，六代以上的TFT LCD生產線投資金額已不亞於12吋晶圓廠，但就整個TFT LCD的應用來說，未來都還有非常高的發展潛力，韓國和日本廠商的積極投資策略，也促使台灣廠商不得不積極面對。就台灣廠商在次世代的投資而言，現階段必須要做一個非常好的跟隨者（follower）角色，在產能擴充腳步上也許可放慢速度，但在新世代生產線的投資進度上是不容延遲的，若在次世代生產線的投資被韓國和日本拉開差距，未來將很難再追上去。由於新世代生產線投資金額越來越大，借錢的銀行、創投等投資人，將會選擇有競爭力的廠商來進行投資，所以競爭力較弱的廠商將由市場決定去留。
OLED可望成為下一個交棒的顯示技術
就全球平面顯示器市場分佈而言，目前重心主要集中在TFT LCD；就市場規模而言，約佔了全球平面顯示器市場規模7成以上。在電槳顯示器（PDP）領域，日韓廠商最近開始傾全力發展PDP產業，主要是看好電漿電視（PDP TV）能在大尺寸電視機市場，特別是40吋以上的電視機市場，在這1～2年內也許要比液晶電視（LCD TV）具成本優勢，但未來透過達到經濟規模的生產效率、液晶電視規格標準化的制定及更有效率且完整的市場供應鏈，電漿電視將受到液晶電視的挑戰。
全球PDP產值在2004年約佔全球平面顯示器的比重約7.6％，隨日韓廠商大幅擴充產能，據光電科技工業協進會（PIDA）推估到2007年將可佔全球平面顯示器的比重約13.0％，成長力非常驚人。在TN／STN方面，雖在全球平面顯示器的市場規模比重逐漸下降，但是在一些較低階產品的應用方面， TN／STN還是有其存在的價值。
被視為下一波顯示技術的明星—有機電激發光顯示器（OLED），在技術及材料瓶頸逐漸突破後，2005年主動式OLED將重新在市場出現，在色彩及穩定度表現將有機會擄獲許多消費者的心，不過在 2～3年內，主動式的OLED面板，在價格上可能還無法跟TFT LCD及彩色STN面板價格匹配。
而微型顯示器方面，目前主要應用在背投影電視，在SONY／EPSON的高溫多晶矽（HTPS）技術和儀器（TI）的DMD技術的挾擊下，反射式矽基液晶（LCoS）能激發出多少市場火花，將是未來技術消長的觀察重點。背投影電視、液晶電視及電漿電視最大差異在於背投影電視未來將生產更大尺寸電視，不需再作新世代生產線的投資，在成本優勢上將是其他兩者無法比擬的地方。
關於平面發射顯示器（Surface-Conduction Electron-Emitter Display；SED）技術，由於還在發展階段，它的發光原理較類似場發射顯示器（FED），目前投入廠商不多，主要是以Canon及東芝共同開發的 36吋SED 為最佳，FED過去在美國有許多廠商投入，不但後來都失敗了，Canon和東芝若能在2～3年內把SED做起來，應可佔有部分市場，否則可能沒機會了。
但是任何一門顯示技術，越多廠商、越多研究機構投入，未來成功的機率越高，若一定要我選擇的話，OLED應是繼TFT LCD後最有希望接棒的顯示技術，未來10年內不僅只有在中小尺寸看得到OLED，在大尺寸應該也沒問題，可撓式顯示技術（Flexible display）也會有OLED的影子。其實各種顯示技術都將在市場上找到最適當的定位，短期內還不至於會消失，只會消長而已。（國科會光電小組執行秘書石大成口述，邵琮淳整理）
This Time, AMD May Have Staying Power
BusinessWeek Online
While skeptics say "prove it," the chipmaker could make its gains on giant rival Intel stick in 2005 -- and maybe even build on them....
See Original Article
While skeptics say "prove it," the chipmaker could make its gains on giant rival Intel stick in 2005 -- and maybe even build on them....
Thursday, December 30, 2004
科技挑戰2005
檯面上，科技產業熱鬧迎接聖誕旺季，實際上，卻望穿秋水不見明年的春燕。這個年關，對許多科技業者來說，可能很難熬了。明年科技市場的春燕到底來不來？還有哪些產業值得期待？
作者：高聖凱
遠見雜誌 2004.12 ／第222期
面對2005，科技產業無不提早戒備，準備迎接景氣寒冬的挑戰。
今年初台積電董事長張忠謀喊出2005年半導體景氣走下坡時，科技業者無不戒慎恐懼。11月初他再度重申，明年半導體景氣成長近乎停滯，更形同為明年景氣悲觀定調。無獨有偶，聯電董事長曹興誠也在公司運動會上清楚指出，明年上半年將是景氣寒冬，「準備進入景氣低迷的隧道，」他說。
保守的論調在國外同樣獲得呼應。明年將接任執行長一職的英特爾營運長歐特里尼（Paul Otellini），日前在內部網路會報上指出，未來十二到十八個月內，英特爾策略發展將從主攻改為防守，最快也得到後年才會大舉進軍市場。
半導體業觸角廣泛，囊括電腦、通訊與消費電子領域，一直是觀瞻科技產業前景的重要指標。國內外半導體大老一致保守看待景氣，讓台灣科技廠商不敢期望明年科技市場能有所突破。
今年市場表現對業者而言，如同洗三溫暖般刺激。上半年科技產業業績一片大好，一掃前幾年的陰霾，各類產品銷售數字也攀升，廠商們無不重拾景氣回春的信心。
但快樂時光短暫，下半年景氣態勢丕變，全球科技業發生諸多事件添變數，市場轉趨保守。而下半年的表現，左右了明年的市場動力，於是明年景氣也再度亮起警訊。「下半年景氣開始變得很詭異，」新上任的飛利浦台灣區總裁莊鈞源表示。
首先電腦產品青黃不接，成長力道受阻。電腦核心晶片龍頭英特爾晶片產品延緩推出，原訂今年9月推出的新一代筆記型電腦晶片平台 Sonoma，因技術問題拖延至明年，造成全球筆記型電腦產品進度落後，原本期待帶動下半年市場的銷售潮落空，讓許多國內筆記型電腦業者叫苦連天。電腦晶片組商矽統總經理陳文熙指出，下半年因為市場反轉，明年不敢過於樂觀。
根據拓墣研究報告指出，明年筆記型產業因為換機潮與無線網路服務率攀升，全球出貨將維持20％成長率，但全球桌上型電腦市場因市場飽和與庫存問題，成長率則不到一成。
除了電腦市場受阻，通訊與消費電子產品下半年也出現庫存問題，將持續蔓延至明年，讓業者飽受壓力。拓墣產業研究所資通訊研究中心經理徐玉學指出，今年8、9月的手機銷售不如預期，第四季通路業者又再度投下大量訂單，他預期庫存將延至明年第一季才能消化完畢。這些因素都讓明年通訊市場充滿變數。
而被視為國內「兩兆雙星」其中重點的液晶面板產業今年雖然業績亮麗，但明年則受到外強威脅，前景烏雲密布。
據國際產業研究單位Display Search統計，今年面板廠商大多仍倚賴換電腦螢幕潮求生，出貨成長率高達兩倍以上，但其中利潤已嚴重壓縮，業者獲利有限。日前全球第二大面板供應商 LG. Philips更公開宣示，明年不排除採取價格戰來壓縮台灣業者空間，據國內業者指出，這對國內面板產業將是重大挑戰，「他們絕對有條件跟台灣玩砍價遊戲。」
但明年科技產業仍有好消息，其中液晶電視、手機與遊戲機產業備受關注，明年可能仍是消費電子與通訊業當道的一年。
而其中的重頭戲，莫過於今年底開打的掌上遊戲機大戰。
消費電子大廠索尼與任天堂，不約而同在今年12月推出新一代掌上型電玩器，雙方已經準備展開廝殺。扮演數位個人娛樂核心平台的掌上遊戲機，被視為測試明年科技市場的前哨站。
索尼與任天堂均看好攜帶型數位娛樂的前景，其中索尼更是首戰掌上電玩遊樂器。據業者指出，索尼產品中內建無線網路與高效率運算晶片，其功能「已與一台電腦無異。」而過去以Game Boy站穩掌上電玩市場的任天堂，也將推出雙螢幕掌上遊樂器應戰，電玩雙雄的交鋒對決，將帶動一波遊戲市場活絡。
此外，通訊業期盼已久的3G新戰場，明年將全面開打，預料帶動另一波手機銷售成長。據拓墣統計，未來三年的全球3G手機市場複合成長率可望達36％，而拓墣通訊研究經理徐玉學更樂觀地認為，明年3G手機突破10％市占率將是輕而易舉。
業者均以「度小年」的態度看待明年景氣，但相信經過明年蟄伏，後年將會再度風起雲湧。曹興誠以「過隧道」來比喻，隧道裡的黑暗總是一時，走過了便海闊天空。
作者：高聖凱
遠見雜誌 2004.12 ／第222期
面對2005，科技產業無不提早戒備，準備迎接景氣寒冬的挑戰。
今年初台積電董事長張忠謀喊出2005年半導體景氣走下坡時，科技業者無不戒慎恐懼。11月初他再度重申，明年半導體景氣成長近乎停滯，更形同為明年景氣悲觀定調。無獨有偶，聯電董事長曹興誠也在公司運動會上清楚指出，明年上半年將是景氣寒冬，「準備進入景氣低迷的隧道，」他說。
保守的論調在國外同樣獲得呼應。明年將接任執行長一職的英特爾營運長歐特里尼（Paul Otellini），日前在內部網路會報上指出，未來十二到十八個月內，英特爾策略發展將從主攻改為防守，最快也得到後年才會大舉進軍市場。
半導體業觸角廣泛，囊括電腦、通訊與消費電子領域，一直是觀瞻科技產業前景的重要指標。國內外半導體大老一致保守看待景氣，讓台灣科技廠商不敢期望明年科技市場能有所突破。
今年市場表現對業者而言，如同洗三溫暖般刺激。上半年科技產業業績一片大好，一掃前幾年的陰霾，各類產品銷售數字也攀升，廠商們無不重拾景氣回春的信心。
但快樂時光短暫，下半年景氣態勢丕變，全球科技業發生諸多事件添變數，市場轉趨保守。而下半年的表現，左右了明年的市場動力，於是明年景氣也再度亮起警訊。「下半年景氣開始變得很詭異，」新上任的飛利浦台灣區總裁莊鈞源表示。
首先電腦產品青黃不接，成長力道受阻。電腦核心晶片龍頭英特爾晶片產品延緩推出，原訂今年9月推出的新一代筆記型電腦晶片平台 Sonoma，因技術問題拖延至明年，造成全球筆記型電腦產品進度落後，原本期待帶動下半年市場的銷售潮落空，讓許多國內筆記型電腦業者叫苦連天。電腦晶片組商矽統總經理陳文熙指出，下半年因為市場反轉，明年不敢過於樂觀。
根據拓墣研究報告指出，明年筆記型產業因為換機潮與無線網路服務率攀升，全球出貨將維持20％成長率，但全球桌上型電腦市場因市場飽和與庫存問題，成長率則不到一成。
除了電腦市場受阻，通訊與消費電子產品下半年也出現庫存問題，將持續蔓延至明年，讓業者飽受壓力。拓墣產業研究所資通訊研究中心經理徐玉學指出，今年8、9月的手機銷售不如預期，第四季通路業者又再度投下大量訂單，他預期庫存將延至明年第一季才能消化完畢。這些因素都讓明年通訊市場充滿變數。
而被視為國內「兩兆雙星」其中重點的液晶面板產業今年雖然業績亮麗，但明年則受到外強威脅，前景烏雲密布。
據國際產業研究單位Display Search統計，今年面板廠商大多仍倚賴換電腦螢幕潮求生，出貨成長率高達兩倍以上，但其中利潤已嚴重壓縮，業者獲利有限。日前全球第二大面板供應商 LG. Philips更公開宣示，明年不排除採取價格戰來壓縮台灣業者空間，據國內業者指出，這對國內面板產業將是重大挑戰，「他們絕對有條件跟台灣玩砍價遊戲。」
但明年科技產業仍有好消息，其中液晶電視、手機與遊戲機產業備受關注，明年可能仍是消費電子與通訊業當道的一年。
而其中的重頭戲，莫過於今年底開打的掌上遊戲機大戰。
消費電子大廠索尼與任天堂，不約而同在今年12月推出新一代掌上型電玩器，雙方已經準備展開廝殺。扮演數位個人娛樂核心平台的掌上遊戲機，被視為測試明年科技市場的前哨站。
索尼與任天堂均看好攜帶型數位娛樂的前景，其中索尼更是首戰掌上電玩遊樂器。據業者指出，索尼產品中內建無線網路與高效率運算晶片，其功能「已與一台電腦無異。」而過去以Game Boy站穩掌上電玩市場的任天堂，也將推出雙螢幕掌上遊樂器應戰，電玩雙雄的交鋒對決，將帶動一波遊戲市場活絡。
此外，通訊業期盼已久的3G新戰場，明年將全面開打，預料帶動另一波手機銷售成長。據拓墣統計，未來三年的全球3G手機市場複合成長率可望達36％，而拓墣通訊研究經理徐玉學更樂觀地認為，明年3G手機突破10％市占率將是輕而易舉。
業者均以「度小年」的態度看待明年景氣，但相信經過明年蟄伏，後年將會再度風起雲湧。曹興誠以「過隧道」來比喻，隧道裡的黑暗總是一時，走過了便海闊天空。
Smart Transport Systems Catch on in Japan
Smart Transport Systems Catch on in Japan
2 hours, 36 minutes ago
By YURI KAGEYAMA, AP Business Writer
TOKYO - Japan has some of the most congested, confusing and cramped streets in the world. It also boasts some of the latest technology in zapping computerized data to millions of cars, delivering what may be the world's smartest way to drive.
Photo
AP Photo
Surf in Secret
Cover your tracks while online by knowing how 'they' watch you, and by keeping email private.
Car navigation systems in Japan can quickly tell drivers which roads have traffic jams. Using a computerized FM radio broadcast system that collects and sends information from more than 28,000 infrared and radio-wave beacons installed along roads, they can also calculate how many seconds it would take to drive through virtually every block of the nation's cities and then find the fastest routes.
Yet only about a million vehicles — of the 70 million on Japanese roads today — take advantage of it.
That's because the most commonly sold navigation systems in Japan give drivers a fraction of the traffic information available.
Equipment offered at dealers is low-grade, and top-of-the-line navigation systems aren't advertised much in Japan.
The better models are also expensive: Equipment costs $950 to $1,900, and the ability to get more timely information adds another $240.
"I'm waiting for our company to put one in," said Tokyo cab driver Keizo Iida, who has no navigation machine.
Another hurdle: Japan Highway Public Corp., the nonprofit organization that oversees the nation's highways and transportation systems, has long been criticized as corrupt and wasteful. The current administration is trying to privatize it to make its operations more transparent and efficient.
Japan isn't the only country where the adoption of smart transportation is taking the slow road.
Electronic toll booths, roads embedded with computer chips and "intelligent" cars don't involve much cutting-edge technology, but knitting the systems together is complicated. Huge obstacles remain before governments, companies and the public can agree on standards, methods and costs to make smart travel a reality.
"To have the whole system, everybody has to agree on how to do it, what kind of technology you're going to use, what kind of standards you're going to use, and who's going to pay for it," said Gabriel Sanchez, a director at Intelligent Transportation Society of America, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit group of state and federal governments and researchers. "And that's extremely complicated."
Without coordinated efforts, smart transportation systems are making baby steps.
In Singapore, the government pushes drivers to use digital road-toll payments. In the United States, discounts on some tolls are offered for drivers paying electronically. Japan also offers such discounts on some highways and bridges.
Sanchez, who visited Japan recently for a conference on transportation, said Japan already leads in telematics, the technology that links cars with computers and telecommunications. That's because both the government and automakers, such as Toyota Motor Corp. (news - web sites), are pushing it.
The next generation of telematics can link cars to one another.
In tests by the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, a Japanese research group, cars connect to other cars wirelessly to get information about a traffic accident or an approaching ambulance.
A picture of an ambulance or a crashed car pops up on the screen when signals are received from other vehicles, and the information is relayed from car to car.
In crowded Japan, even pedestrians could eventually use telematics.
Among the recent research projects are combined glasses and earphones for the blind that pick up infrared signals saying "red, red, red" or "green, green, green" as they approach an intersection.
2 hours, 36 minutes ago
By YURI KAGEYAMA, AP Business Writer
TOKYO - Japan has some of the most congested, confusing and cramped streets in the world. It also boasts some of the latest technology in zapping computerized data to millions of cars, delivering what may be the world's smartest way to drive.
Photo
AP Photo
Surf in Secret
Cover your tracks while online by knowing how 'they' watch you, and by keeping email private.
Car navigation systems in Japan can quickly tell drivers which roads have traffic jams. Using a computerized FM radio broadcast system that collects and sends information from more than 28,000 infrared and radio-wave beacons installed along roads, they can also calculate how many seconds it would take to drive through virtually every block of the nation's cities and then find the fastest routes.
Yet only about a million vehicles — of the 70 million on Japanese roads today — take advantage of it.
That's because the most commonly sold navigation systems in Japan give drivers a fraction of the traffic information available.
Equipment offered at dealers is low-grade, and top-of-the-line navigation systems aren't advertised much in Japan.
The better models are also expensive: Equipment costs $950 to $1,900, and the ability to get more timely information adds another $240.
"I'm waiting for our company to put one in," said Tokyo cab driver Keizo Iida, who has no navigation machine.
Another hurdle: Japan Highway Public Corp., the nonprofit organization that oversees the nation's highways and transportation systems, has long been criticized as corrupt and wasteful. The current administration is trying to privatize it to make its operations more transparent and efficient.
Japan isn't the only country where the adoption of smart transportation is taking the slow road.
Electronic toll booths, roads embedded with computer chips and "intelligent" cars don't involve much cutting-edge technology, but knitting the systems together is complicated. Huge obstacles remain before governments, companies and the public can agree on standards, methods and costs to make smart travel a reality.
"To have the whole system, everybody has to agree on how to do it, what kind of technology you're going to use, what kind of standards you're going to use, and who's going to pay for it," said Gabriel Sanchez, a director at Intelligent Transportation Society of America, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit group of state and federal governments and researchers. "And that's extremely complicated."
Without coordinated efforts, smart transportation systems are making baby steps.
In Singapore, the government pushes drivers to use digital road-toll payments. In the United States, discounts on some tolls are offered for drivers paying electronically. Japan also offers such discounts on some highways and bridges.
Sanchez, who visited Japan recently for a conference on transportation, said Japan already leads in telematics, the technology that links cars with computers and telecommunications. That's because both the government and automakers, such as Toyota Motor Corp. (news - web sites), are pushing it.
The next generation of telematics can link cars to one another.
In tests by the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, a Japanese research group, cars connect to other cars wirelessly to get information about a traffic accident or an approaching ambulance.
A picture of an ambulance or a crashed car pops up on the screen when signals are received from other vehicles, and the information is relayed from car to car.
In crowded Japan, even pedestrians could eventually use telematics.
Among the recent research projects are combined glasses and earphones for the blind that pick up infrared signals saying "red, red, red" or "green, green, green" as they approach an intersection.
Tuesday, December 28, 2004
Googlezon: The future of media
Googlezon: The future of media
--Martin LaMonica
Convinced that today's media industry is in for dramatic turmoil? Here's some futuristic thinking worth a look, even for jaded media watchers.
The scenario: Within ten years from today Google and Amazon merge, forcing the beacon of mainstream media to go offline and sue the Googlezon colossus in the United States Supreme Court for violation of copyright law.
In an eight-minute flash presentation (http://www.broom.org/epic/), the Museum of Media History presents its picture for how the Fourth Estate will be toppled by participatory journalism, aided by the titans of the Internet industry.
Seminal moments leading to the destruction of the media industry include the creation of the Web, the founding of Amazon and Google, blogging, TiVo and social networking services, such as Friendster.
But it's the year 2004, according to the clip, that sets the stage for dramatic changes in how people consume--and make--their news and information. Sony and Philips announce the first mass-produced electronic paper; Microsoft unveils a social news filter Newsbot; and Amazon unveils its own search engine.
Then the video clip's makers get really creative. Awash in cash from going public, Google acquires TiVo in 2005. The following year sees the emergence of the Google Grid, which allows consumers to access an unlimited amount of storage and bandwidth to share media.
Google and Amazon merge in 2008 and trump Microsoft's competitive efforts with an algorithm that allows computers to construct news stories dynamically tailored to each individual user.
The symbolic demise of the Fourth Estate occurs in 2011 when the New York Times Company loses its suit against Googlezon.
In 2014, Googlezon unleashes EPIC, the Evolving Personalized Information Construct, which collects and filters media of all types to consumers. Some people are actually employed, too, paid according to the popularity of their work.
--Martin LaMonica
Convinced that today's media industry is in for dramatic turmoil? Here's some futuristic thinking worth a look, even for jaded media watchers.
The scenario: Within ten years from today Google and Amazon merge, forcing the beacon of mainstream media to go offline and sue the Googlezon colossus in the United States Supreme Court for violation of copyright law.
In an eight-minute flash presentation (http://www.broom.org/epic/), the Museum of Media History presents its picture for how the Fourth Estate will be toppled by participatory journalism, aided by the titans of the Internet industry.
Seminal moments leading to the destruction of the media industry include the creation of the Web, the founding of Amazon and Google, blogging, TiVo and social networking services, such as Friendster.
But it's the year 2004, according to the clip, that sets the stage for dramatic changes in how people consume--and make--their news and information. Sony and Philips announce the first mass-produced electronic paper; Microsoft unveils a social news filter Newsbot; and Amazon unveils its own search engine.
Then the video clip's makers get really creative. Awash in cash from going public, Google acquires TiVo in 2005. The following year sees the emergence of the Google Grid, which allows consumers to access an unlimited amount of storage and bandwidth to share media.
Google and Amazon merge in 2008 and trump Microsoft's competitive efforts with an algorithm that allows computers to construct news stories dynamically tailored to each individual user.
The symbolic demise of the Fourth Estate occurs in 2011 when the New York Times Company loses its suit against Googlezon.
In 2014, Googlezon unleashes EPIC, the Evolving Personalized Information Construct, which collects and filters media of all types to consumers. Some people are actually employed, too, paid according to the popularity of their work.
Saturday, December 25, 2004
電信業千億營收將蒸發
前中華電信董事長毛治國大預言 電信業千億營收將蒸發 寄給朋友 友善列印
2頁之1
【文／黃創夏】
「領導者必須有策略性思惟，否則祇會投入一大堆資源到注定要被淘汰的東西裡。」
退休後，前中華電信董事長毛治國回到校園任教。他認為，別說大象，「恐龍也可以跳芭蕾」。曾經負責推動台灣電信自由化政策，並實際投入中華電信營運的毛治國，退休一年多以來走訪了美、日與歐洲的電信產業，也和發明電話的美國貝爾實驗室等專家多次交換意見，毛治國發現，各國都在積極因應即將來臨的「電訊風暴」，但台灣卻似乎尚未有完善的準備。
「快的話，三到五年全球大風暴即將來臨」，毛治國分析，這場風暴的本質是新科技即將成熟，產業界將會發生一場「海嘯式」的「破壞性創造」，屆時，電信業者賴以生存的語音通話、頻寬設備都將被一掃而空，以千億元計算的營收都將被「蒸發」。以下，是毛治國口述內容摘要：
我所謂的電信風暴，或者也可以說是電訊風暴，是指將來發生的改變不是零零碎碎的，而是結構性的，預期全球電信業者可能重新洗牌，現有的電信業者將要發生大規模的合併和重整，甚至資訊廠商、廣電產業都可能捲入這一波變局，快的話，我預計三到五年，這一個風暴就可能在全球發生。
結構性全球電訊風暴將發生
所謂結構性改變，全球目前電信產業的分類或結構方式都還是垂直區分，在電信法下的管理規則，包括固網、行動、加值服務管理規則等，市場與市場之間是垂直的分法，政府發放執照也是垂直的，固網有固網的IP網路，有自己的基礎設施、內容應用等；而行動也有自己的實體網路、虛擬網路、應用層、內容層，一層一層上去，數值也是自成一個體系，但科技的改變，將會造成結構性的改變。
其實，許多人已經看到這個浪頭了，就是如台北市推動全區無線上網的WiFi，但真正主浪頭，我誇張點形容是海嘯的話，就是Wi-Max，將帶來的結構性意涵是，電信無法歸類，是歸行動或固網？也就是說，在這裡進一步造成匯流。
歐、日以朝結構性整合發展
這個轉向在歐洲及日本已在發生，歐洲和日本電信法都朝這個方向修法，不再發固網或行動執照，而是發基礎建設執照，業者若要建固網就自己建，若是採用WiMAX而需要頻寬，就配給你，若是網路內要做廣播，廣播頻寬我也配給你；現在很多計程車後座可以看電視，就不是透過電信網路，而是透過廣播網路。
Internet有一個很高的理想，就是要做到任何時間、地點、人，未來還要再加上任何設備都可以被連接，現在行動歸行動，固網歸固網。但消費者希望的平台服務，各式各樣的管道都有，任何設備取得任何資訊，要語音就給語音，要看video畫面使用者不必傷腦筋，在Wi-Max的技術下，未來，頻寬已不是問題，就好像空氣、陽光和水一樣，隨手可得就變成不具經濟價值，電信系統業者的利基將會喪失。
這一天來得比大家想像中得快，歐洲和日本為回應這個情形，歐洲把電子化媒體、電子化的廣播系統，行動、電信等，取一個名稱：electronic communication，電子通訊產業，要做完整的服務，啪一聲，全部都要做。
狂潮的開端：行動電話出現
一九八○年代中期，ＡＴ＆Ｔ（美國電話電報公司）當時ＣＥＯ預測，行動電話全球需求祇有一百萬台，他當時沒有看出行動電話的潛力。但科技在後面推，造成「破壞性創造」，新技術一旦對了消費市場胃口，在消費市場證明其價值，爆開出來的市場，擋都擋不住。
行動電話出現後，電信業者面臨挑戰，網路突然變成無線，語音市場就被瓜分掉了，且比原來固網更厲害的是，固網是以住戶為單位，公司行號、部門為單位，行動以個人為單位，市場切得更深，以社會每個組成分子為單位，使得在已飽合的傳統電話之外，再創新的市場，這是電信通訊系統的第一個衝擊。
Thursday, December 23, 2004
What’s Next for Google
What’s Next for Google
By Charles H. Ferguson January 2005
Page 1 of 9 next
from www.technologyreview.com
For Eric Schmidt, Google’s CEO, 2004 was a very good year. His firm led the search industry, the fastest-growing major sector in technology; it went public, raising $1.67 billion; its stock price soared; and its revenues more than doubled, to $3 billion. But as the search market ripens into something worthy of Microsoft’s attention, those familiar with the software business have been wondering whether Google, apparently triumphant, is in fact headed off the cliff.
I’ve seen it happen before. In September 1995, I had breakfast with Jim Barksdale, then CEO of Netscape Communications, at Il Fornaio in Palo Alto, CA, a restaurant popular with Silicon Valley dealmakers. Netscape had gone public a few months earlier, and Netscape Navigator dominated the browser market. Vermeer Technologies, the company that Randy Forgaard and I had founded 18 months earlier, had just announced the release of FrontPage, a Windows application that let people develop their own websites. Netscape and Microsoft were both preparing to develop competing products. Our choice was to stay independent and die or sell the company to one of them.
At breakfast, and repeatedly over the following months, I tried to persuade Barksdale to take Microsoft seriously. I argued that if it was to survive, Netscape needed to imitate Microsoft’s strategy: the creation and control of proprietary industry standards. Serenely, Barksdale explained that Netscape actually invited Microsoft to imitate its products, because they would never catch up. The Internet, he said, rewarded openness and nonproprietary standards. When I heard that, I realized that despite my reservations about the monopolist in Redmond, WA, I had little choice. Four months later, I sold my company to Microsoft for $130 million in Microsoft stock*. Four years later, Netscape was effectively dead, while Microsoft’s stock had quadrupled.
Google now faces choices as fundamental as those Netscape faced in 1995. Google, whose headquarters in Mountain View, CA—familiarly called the Googleplex—is only five kilometers from Netscape’s former home, needn’t perish as Netscape did, but it could. Despite everything Google has—the swelling revenues, the cash from its initial public offering, the 300 million users, the brand recognition, the superbly elegant engineering—its position is in fact quite fragile. Google’s site is still the best Web search service, and Gmail, its new Web-based e-mail service, Google Desktop, its desktop search tool, and Google Deskbar, its toolbar, are very cool. But that’s all they are. As yet, nothing prevents the world from switching (painlessly, instantly) to Microsoft search services and software, particularly if they are integrated with the Microsoft products that people already use.
In November 2004, Microsoft launched a beta, or test, version of a search engine designed to answer questions posed in everyday language and to serve results customized to users’ geographical locations. Microsoft has also created additional search software for its Internet Explorer browser and its Office productivity applications. That Microsoft is developing its own Web search engine and desktop search tools is significant in itself. But its competition with Google will have repercussions far beyond the existing search business—or even the software industry itself. Google and Microsoft will be fighting to control the organization, search, and retrieval of all digital information, on all types of digital devices. Collectively, these markets are much larger than the existing market for search services. Over the next several decades, in the view of search industry insiders I’ve spoken with, they could generate perhaps half a trillion dollars in cumulative revenue.
Microsoft is starting late but has extraordinary resources and powers of persistence—and it joined the browser wars late, too. In contrast, Google is youthful, adventurous, and innovative, and it does some things extremely well. The contest could end in a Cold War standoff, a decisive victory for either side, or even mutual destruction, if the competition frightens away customers and investors.
Peaceful coexistence, however, seems unlikely.
The Prize and the Contestants
Eric Schmidt and Microsoft’s Bill Gates will be competing against each other for the third time. For both men, the contest is personal as well as financial.
Gates’s philanthropic ambitions depend on Microsoft’s continued health. And like a rock star who yearns to be admired for his brains, Gates wants to create new technology. Only by doing so can he overcome his reputation as the college dropout who built his empire by turning other people’s ideas into mediocre products. “Bill Gates is desperate to prove that he can innovate,” commented a Microsoft executive who prefers to remain anonymous. “And it just might kill us.” He pointed to the ambitious goals and long delays that have plagued Longhorn, Microsoft’s future (and search-centric) version of Windows.
By contrast, the three men who run Google have impeccable technology credentials. Schmidt has a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, did research at Xerox PARC, and became chief technology officer of Sun Microsystems, where he oversaw the development of many impressive technologies. In business, however, Schmidt has twice been beaten by Gates. The first time was at Sun; the second was at Novell, where Schmidt was CEO. Both firms made enormous mistakes. Schmidt wasn’t entirely responsible, however, because his hands were tied by his superiors at Sun and by his predecessors at Novell. At Google, Schmidt must once again share power—with Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Google’s brilliant but young and possibly overconfident founders, both “on leave” from Stanford University’s PhD program in computer science. Page and Brin still call many of the shots, and the company’s unusual capital structure gives them about 30 percent of the voting shares.
Google seeks to become the gatekeeper for not only the public Web but also the “dark” or hidden Web of private databases, dynamically generated pages, controlled-access sites, and Web servers within organizations (estimated to be tens or even hundreds of times larger than the public Web); the data on personal computer hard drives; and the data on consumer devices ranging from PDAs to cell phones to iPods to digital cameras to TiVo players. Google’s founders understand the scale of the opportunity. Larry Page recently said, “Only a fraction of the world’s information is indexed on our computers. We are continually working on new ways to index more.... Thirty percent [of our engineers] are devoted to emerging businesses.” And Sergey Brin once told Technology Review’s editor in chief, “The perfect search engine would be like the mind of God.”
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/01/images/fugeson20105.gif
Until now, competition in the search industry has been limited to the Web and has been conducted algorithm by algorithm, feature by feature, and site by site. This competition has resulted in a Google and Yahoo duopoly. If nothing were to change, the growth of Microsoft’s search business would only create a broader oligopoly, similar, perhaps, to those in other media markets. But the search industry will soon serve more than just a Web-based consumer market. It will also include an industrial market for enterprise software products and services, a mass market for personal productivity and communications software, and software and services for a sea of new consumer devices. Search tools will comb through not only Microsoft Office and PDF documents, but also e-mail, instant messages, music, and images; with the spread of voice recognition, Internet telephony, and broadband, it will also be possible to index and search telephone conversations, voice mail, and video files.
All these new search products and services will have to work with each other and with many other systems. This, in turn, will require standards.
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/01/images/fugeson30105.gif
The emergence of search standards would encourage tremendous growth and provide many benefits to users. But standardization would also introduce a new and destabilizing force into the industry. Instead of competing through incremental improvements in the quality and range of their search services, Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo will be forced into a winner-take-all competition for control of industry standards. Steve Jurvetson, a venture capitalist at the firm of Draper Fisher Jurvetson in Menlo Park, CA, says, “This is something of a holy war for Microsoft*, and one they can’t bear to lose.”
In short, the search industry is ready for an architecture war.
By Charles H. Ferguson January 2005
Page 1 of 9 next
from www.technologyreview.com
For Eric Schmidt, Google’s CEO, 2004 was a very good year. His firm led the search industry, the fastest-growing major sector in technology; it went public, raising $1.67 billion; its stock price soared; and its revenues more than doubled, to $3 billion. But as the search market ripens into something worthy of Microsoft’s attention, those familiar with the software business have been wondering whether Google, apparently triumphant, is in fact headed off the cliff.
I’ve seen it happen before. In September 1995, I had breakfast with Jim Barksdale, then CEO of Netscape Communications, at Il Fornaio in Palo Alto, CA, a restaurant popular with Silicon Valley dealmakers. Netscape had gone public a few months earlier, and Netscape Navigator dominated the browser market. Vermeer Technologies, the company that Randy Forgaard and I had founded 18 months earlier, had just announced the release of FrontPage, a Windows application that let people develop their own websites. Netscape and Microsoft were both preparing to develop competing products. Our choice was to stay independent and die or sell the company to one of them.
At breakfast, and repeatedly over the following months, I tried to persuade Barksdale to take Microsoft seriously. I argued that if it was to survive, Netscape needed to imitate Microsoft’s strategy: the creation and control of proprietary industry standards. Serenely, Barksdale explained that Netscape actually invited Microsoft to imitate its products, because they would never catch up. The Internet, he said, rewarded openness and nonproprietary standards. When I heard that, I realized that despite my reservations about the monopolist in Redmond, WA, I had little choice. Four months later, I sold my company to Microsoft for $130 million in Microsoft stock*. Four years later, Netscape was effectively dead, while Microsoft’s stock had quadrupled.
Google now faces choices as fundamental as those Netscape faced in 1995. Google, whose headquarters in Mountain View, CA—familiarly called the Googleplex—is only five kilometers from Netscape’s former home, needn’t perish as Netscape did, but it could. Despite everything Google has—the swelling revenues, the cash from its initial public offering, the 300 million users, the brand recognition, the superbly elegant engineering—its position is in fact quite fragile. Google’s site is still the best Web search service, and Gmail, its new Web-based e-mail service, Google Desktop, its desktop search tool, and Google Deskbar, its toolbar, are very cool. But that’s all they are. As yet, nothing prevents the world from switching (painlessly, instantly) to Microsoft search services and software, particularly if they are integrated with the Microsoft products that people already use.
In November 2004, Microsoft launched a beta, or test, version of a search engine designed to answer questions posed in everyday language and to serve results customized to users’ geographical locations. Microsoft has also created additional search software for its Internet Explorer browser and its Office productivity applications. That Microsoft is developing its own Web search engine and desktop search tools is significant in itself. But its competition with Google will have repercussions far beyond the existing search business—or even the software industry itself. Google and Microsoft will be fighting to control the organization, search, and retrieval of all digital information, on all types of digital devices. Collectively, these markets are much larger than the existing market for search services. Over the next several decades, in the view of search industry insiders I’ve spoken with, they could generate perhaps half a trillion dollars in cumulative revenue.
Microsoft is starting late but has extraordinary resources and powers of persistence—and it joined the browser wars late, too. In contrast, Google is youthful, adventurous, and innovative, and it does some things extremely well. The contest could end in a Cold War standoff, a decisive victory for either side, or even mutual destruction, if the competition frightens away customers and investors.
Peaceful coexistence, however, seems unlikely.
The Prize and the Contestants
Eric Schmidt and Microsoft’s Bill Gates will be competing against each other for the third time. For both men, the contest is personal as well as financial.
Gates’s philanthropic ambitions depend on Microsoft’s continued health. And like a rock star who yearns to be admired for his brains, Gates wants to create new technology. Only by doing so can he overcome his reputation as the college dropout who built his empire by turning other people’s ideas into mediocre products. “Bill Gates is desperate to prove that he can innovate,” commented a Microsoft executive who prefers to remain anonymous. “And it just might kill us.” He pointed to the ambitious goals and long delays that have plagued Longhorn, Microsoft’s future (and search-centric) version of Windows.
By contrast, the three men who run Google have impeccable technology credentials. Schmidt has a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, did research at Xerox PARC, and became chief technology officer of Sun Microsystems, where he oversaw the development of many impressive technologies. In business, however, Schmidt has twice been beaten by Gates. The first time was at Sun; the second was at Novell, where Schmidt was CEO. Both firms made enormous mistakes. Schmidt wasn’t entirely responsible, however, because his hands were tied by his superiors at Sun and by his predecessors at Novell. At Google, Schmidt must once again share power—with Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Google’s brilliant but young and possibly overconfident founders, both “on leave” from Stanford University’s PhD program in computer science. Page and Brin still call many of the shots, and the company’s unusual capital structure gives them about 30 percent of the voting shares.
Google seeks to become the gatekeeper for not only the public Web but also the “dark” or hidden Web of private databases, dynamically generated pages, controlled-access sites, and Web servers within organizations (estimated to be tens or even hundreds of times larger than the public Web); the data on personal computer hard drives; and the data on consumer devices ranging from PDAs to cell phones to iPods to digital cameras to TiVo players. Google’s founders understand the scale of the opportunity. Larry Page recently said, “Only a fraction of the world’s information is indexed on our computers. We are continually working on new ways to index more.... Thirty percent [of our engineers] are devoted to emerging businesses.” And Sergey Brin once told Technology Review’s editor in chief, “The perfect search engine would be like the mind of God.”
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/01/images/fugeson20105.gif
Until now, competition in the search industry has been limited to the Web and has been conducted algorithm by algorithm, feature by feature, and site by site. This competition has resulted in a Google and Yahoo duopoly. If nothing were to change, the growth of Microsoft’s search business would only create a broader oligopoly, similar, perhaps, to those in other media markets. But the search industry will soon serve more than just a Web-based consumer market. It will also include an industrial market for enterprise software products and services, a mass market for personal productivity and communications software, and software and services for a sea of new consumer devices. Search tools will comb through not only Microsoft Office and PDF documents, but also e-mail, instant messages, music, and images; with the spread of voice recognition, Internet telephony, and broadband, it will also be possible to index and search telephone conversations, voice mail, and video files.
All these new search products and services will have to work with each other and with many other systems. This, in turn, will require standards.
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/01/images/fugeson30105.gif
The emergence of search standards would encourage tremendous growth and provide many benefits to users. But standardization would also introduce a new and destabilizing force into the industry. Instead of competing through incremental improvements in the quality and range of their search services, Microsoft, Google, and Yahoo will be forced into a winner-take-all competition for control of industry standards. Steve Jurvetson, a venture capitalist at the firm of Draper Fisher Jurvetson in Menlo Park, CA, says, “This is something of a holy war for Microsoft*, and one they can’t bear to lose.”
In short, the search industry is ready for an architecture war.
Pursuing Lock-In
Architecture wars (also known as standards wars) occur because information technology markets require standards in order to manage complexity, communication, and technological change. Historically, proprietary control over a major information technology standard has created more wealth than nearly any other human activity. Architectural dominance mints money; and managed properly, it lasts forever. IBM’s mainframe architecture was introduced in 1964; Intel developed its first microprocessor in 1971; Microsoft’s first operating system was introduced in 1981; Cisco Systems marketed its first router in 1986. None shows any signs of disappearing, and each has already generated hundreds of billions of dollars in cumulative revenues.
It is only standardization that makes it possible for any browser to display any Web page, or for people to read the documents and e-mail messages they receive from each other. Standards are generally based upon the interfaces that constitute the authorized ways for software systems to communicate with each other. These include application programming interfaces, or APIs, like those Microsoft provides for developing Windows applications; communications protocols such as HTTP (the hypertext transfer protocol), which allows browsers to communicate with websites; and content or document structures, such as the HTML (hypertext markup language) standard for Web pages, or the document structure used by Microsoft Word. These standards are embedded in larger architectures used in the design of general-purpose commercial systems, or platforms, such as the Windows operating system. Platforms, in turn, are used as the starting point for specific applications, such as word processors or accounting systems.
Sometimes standardization is achieved through nonproprietary efforts managed by governments, standards bodies, or industry coalitions. Examples include the basic Internet protocols, the HDTV broadcasting standard, and most telephone standards. In other cases, like that of the Ethernet protocol invented by Bob Metcalfe while at Xerox PARC, a company donates an architecture to a standards body in the hope of creating or expanding a market. The open-source movement is an interesting variant of nonproprietary standardization based on decentralized control. In the case of open-source software like the Linux operating system, a community of creators and users in effect votes continuously on the direction of a standard.
But in most information technology markets, standardization is achieved via market competition. These contests are extremely complex, but they have a common underlying logic, which Charles Morris and I described a decade ago in our book Computer Wars. The best technology does not always win; superior strategy is often more important. Winners do tend, however, to share several important characteristics. They provide general-purpose, hardware-independent architectures, like Microsoft’s operating systems, rather than bundled hardware and software, like Apple’s and Sun’s systems. Winning architectures are proprietary and difficult to clone, but they are also externally “open”—that is, they provide publicly accessible interfaces upon which a wide variety of applications can be constructed by independent vendors and users. In this way, an architecture reaches all markets, and also creates “lock-in”—meaning that users become captive to it, unable to switch to rival systems without great pain and expense.
Architecture wars generally begin with a fierce competition for market share. Eventually, the market settles on a de facto standard, a dominant architecture under the proprietary control of one company. Subsequently, only a few rivals survive in the leader’s shadow, while the leader expands its empire into neighboring markets.
The search industry is the next place in which a vast architectural empire could be built. Some portions of the emerging search space are now occupied by Google, others by Microsoft, most by nobody. But in the end, there will probably be room for just one architecture. Google’s idyllic childhood must therefore give way to a contest much like those Microsoft has fought and won against companies ranging from IBM to Novell to Apple to Netscape. But for several reasons, this architecture war may end differently. First, many of the companies defeated by Microsoft over the past 20 years suffered as much from self-inflicted wounds as from Microsoft’s predation. In Eric Schmidt, Google may have a CEO with the technological depth and painfully acquired experience essential to surviving Bill Gates. Second, Google’s principal services run on a platform that Microsoft doesn’t control—the Web. Third, in some cases (like its fight against Linux, for example), Microsoft’s software is now the high-cost incumbent.
Fourth, some analysts believe that Microsoft has lost its edge, that its size and age have bred complacency. Commenting on the collision between Google and Microsoft, Internet industry observer John Battelle recently wrote, “Microsoft is indeed a fearsome competitor, with extraordinary resources (and I don’t mean the $50 billion in cash; I mean the ability to leverage Windows). But it’s a middle-aged company that moves far more slowly than it did ten years ago, when it first recognized the Web threat.” (For John Battelle’s views on the future of publishing, see “Megaphone,” p. 36.)
Fifth, Microsoft hasn’t always won: Adobe and Intuit are doing just fine, MSN hasn’t killed AOL or Yahoo, and the Xbox hasn’t defeated the Japanese game industry (not yet, anyway). And finally, Microsoft’s recent entry in the search wars—the beta version of MSN’s search tool—is decidedly unimpressive. (Then again, Windows 1.0 was pretty bad, too.)
So Google’s defeat is not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, if it does everything right, it could become an enormously powerful and profitable company, representing the most serious challenge Microsoft has faced since the Apple Macintosh. But if Microsoft gets serious about search—and there is every reason to believe that it will—Google will need brilliant strategy and flawless execution simply to survive.
Does Google understand the gravity of the challenges that may confront it? Does it have a strategy for winning an architectural war? The evidence is equivocal.
Google has software developers skilled enough to construct a powerful architectural position. It has hired both newly minted PhDs and experienced technologists from Netscape and even Microsoft. One of its newer employees is Adam Bosworth, famous to software developers for developing the HTML engine in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer and for his pioneering work on the Extensible Markup Language, or XML, the standard for machine-to-machine communication on the Web. Other recent hires, significant for their architectural expertise, include Rob Pike, a pioneer of the Unix operating system at Bell Labs; Joshua Bloch, a leading Java coder from Sun; and Cédric Beust, who developed the Weblogic platform at BEA Systems.
One Google manager, who preferred not to be named, said his company understands the need for proprietary control, and that future products would prove it. In late 2004, Google did release two important new APIs, for its Deskbar search tool and its advertising systems. But the Google executive declined to comment on future plans, noting that his employer had become secretive to the point of paranoia. (Indeed, Google’s senior executives refused to be interviewed for this article.)
The executive then went on to say, “Look, everyone here—right up to our CEO and board of directors—has had the shit kicked out of them over the last five years. A lot of them were at Netscape, or at failed dot coms. Nobody I work with is complacent, and they’re all very smart.” But there are two important people who haven’t had the shit kicked out of them: Google’s founders. In a Playboy interview published shortly before Google’s IPO, Brin and Page did not mention competitive threats. Rather, they talked about corporate ethics, the creation of foundations, and their efforts to make Google a great place to work.
Google is a great place to work. My friends there absolutely love the place, and in part for that reason, they work very hard. Google allows pets and provides employees with laundry service, drinks, meals, massages, car washes, and (soon) child care. Its corporate motto is “Don’t be evil.” But long ago, a professor of mine, noting my youthful idealism, remarked that the only successful neutral nations are those, like Switzerland, that are permanently armed to the teeth. And for Google, neutrality is not an option.
But what specifically should Google do? How is Microsoft likely to attack, what will the contest look like, and what will decide its outcome? Let’s begin with the current state of search.The State of Search
For a long time, search engines were expensive luxuries for those who operated them. They never made money. Market leadership traded hands repeatedly. Sites like AltaVista rose to prominence and fell away. The entirely separate business of selling software products for text indexing and retrieval was a backwater. But then things changed. As the Internet and the Web grew, searchable digital content began to supplant conventional media, and efforts to improve the quality of search results intensified.
For many years, reference publications like the Science Citation Index have ranked scientific papers’ “impact” by counting the number of times they were cited in other papers. Brin and Page’s insight was that if hyperlinks were viewed as citations, the same thing could be done for the Web. That insight led to the first truly superior search engine. Stanford applied for a patent on Brin and Page’s “PageRank” technique in 1998 (it was granted in 2001). Soon afterward, Brin and Page started Google and raised money from top-tier venture capital firms Sequoia Capital and Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield, and Byers.
Today, the search industry has two layers. The leaders, Google and Yahoo, both provide “retail” search services on their own websites. But both firms also license, on a highly selective basis, their infrastructure and services to other companies in a “wholesale” market. For example, Google provides the underlying search services for AOL and Amazon.com’s A9 search subsidiary. Looksmart powered MSN Search for some years. Now, however, Microsoft is developing its own search engine.
Google holds nearly 40 percent of the U.S. retail search market, more than 50 percent of the U.S. wholesale market, and larger shares of the global market. Yahoo enjoys a rough parity with Google in the United States, and Baidu has been expanding in China. Interestingly, while Google operates its own service in China, it also holds an equity stake in Baidu.
Google derives nearly all of its revenues from advertising, of two distinct kinds. First, it places advertisements on pages of search results returned by its own site. Those advertisements are selected according to the words used in the search. Advertisers bid in highly complex auctions for the right to place ads on results pages for searches that use specific terms like “used cars,” “SUVs,” and so forth. Second, Google manages advertising for a wide network of external websites for which it provides ad placement services. It has combined its search engine with sophisticated text-matching and auction systems to target, price, sell, and evaluate its advertisements, both those placed on its own site and those on its affiliates’.
Some of these affiliates use Google’s search services, but most do not. In fact, almost half of Google’s revenue and profits come from its external advertising network, a business where its superior indexing and search capabilities play a less critical role. Google also sells a “search appliance,” a Linux server running its indexing and search software, to organizations wishing to provide search services for their internal Web servers. This business, however, is quite small.
Yahoo’s search business is similar. Like Google, Yahoo earns a substantial fraction of its total revenue through search-related advertising, both on its own site and on a network of affiliates. Yahoo’s portal offers a wider variety of information services than Google, including news, dating, chat, and shopping. But Google is rapidly diversifying: in addition to allowing users to download its free personal search tool, Google’s website has news, shopping, e-mail, and photo storage services in various stages of development.
Today, the wholesale search market has significant barriers to entry. Economies of scale have asserted themselves, secondary competitors have folded, and the creation of new search engines by startups is becoming prohibitively expensive. Consider: to crawl, index, and search more than eight billion pages—still only a fraction of the Web—Google now operates a global infrastructure of more than 250,000 Linux-based servers of its own design, according to one Google executive I spoke with, and it is becoming a major consumer of electrical power, computer hardware, and telecommunications bandwidth.
But the consolidation of the wholesale market does not mean that the search industry is mature. Quite the contrary.
First, there is no lack of new competition. This comes from any number of sources: large firms, like Amazon and its A9 subsidiary, with sufficient resources to enter the market; startups commercializing a wide variety of new search functions; information retrieval and filtering firms such as LexisNexis or Vivísimo, whose products are competitive with or complementary to Web-based search services; and, in a class by itself, Microsoft. Moreover, while basic Web crawling is a mature technology with high barriers to entry, many other search-related functions are not. Secondly, services that have thus far been confined almost exclusively to the public Web are now expanding to personal computers, the dark Web, and other platforms. Finally, the search arena is still unstructured and without standards. Search sites are self-contained islands. They do not interoperate, and independent developers cannot use search sites as platforms upon which to offer specialized products and services, because, with minor exceptions, the search industry lacks open APIs. For the most part, each service is confined to what it can do on its own.
But the search industry cannot resist APIs, standards, and open architectures much longer. No single company can offer users all the functions they want. Users will demand search products and services that work across many different platforms. And Microsoft will almost certainly exploit both its ownership of the Windows platform and its search engine. Indeed, Microsoft has already announced that it intends to provide third-party developers with APIs to its new search engine, enabling them to construct applications based on it.
Trends in Search: Technology
The advantage conferred on Google by its PageRank algorithm, once overwhelming, is gradually disappearing. Many other clever algorithms have been developed; indexing and searching are being applied to more data sources and data types; and ever more nuanced user interfaces and functions are being offered to users.
Some of these efforts seem quite promising. Amazon has scanned more than 100,000 books and made their text searchable for Amazon users. Google Print provides a similar service and also offers direct links to bookselling sites. PubSub, a small startup in New York City, has developed a high-performance “matching engine” that monitors online information: if you subscribe to a topic, PubSub will scan data in real time and notify you whenever there is news. For the sorting and clustering of search results, the leader is Vivísimo, a Carnegie Mellon University spinoff in Pittsburgh, with its new Clusty website. Software from Blinkx, of San Francisco, lets users search multiple information sources, including their desktops, websites, and blogs. X1 Technologies of Pasadena, CA, also provides a popular desktop search tool.
As these examples suggest, many new search functions are being introduced by startups rather than by Google or established companies. A few of these startups may become large, independent firms. But most will remain small vendors, will be acquired, or will simply fail, depending on what Google, Yahoo, or Microsoft choose to do. Many offer products that would be natural additions or complements to existing search services, since their utility depends upon access to a search engine. But Google and Yahoo do not usually provide such access, even though it would benefit users. Google’s sole Web API is laughably limited, offering little functionality and contractually restricting users to 1,000 queries per day.
Just what services could be built upon a fully open Google architecture? They could take many forms, but some of the most obvious would make indexing and searching processes on the desktop, on Web servers, and on Google’s own website work together better. A single search could then span not just Google’s index of the public Web but whatever other sources might be appropriate: a newspaper archive, a medical database, an antique-car parts catalogue, or your own hard drive. Google, or others building upon its APIs, would unify the results, explain any access restrictions on particular sources, and facilitate purchases of information. At the same time, independent firms could create services that call on Google’s search and indexing functions to retrieve information, but present that information in new and creative ways.
As the search industry evolves, it also touches upon—and often competes with—a widening array of other industries, from publishing to software, in both business and consumer markets. The search industry wants to become the starting point for a larger proportion of digital activities. Some companies are happy to oblige:Amazon, for instance, opens its databases to search services, so that search results can point directly to relevant Amazon products, bypassing the need to navigate Amazon’s own site. Others are less welcoming. Microsoft will be displeased, to put it mildly, if Google Desktop begins to supplant the traditional Windows desktop interface and file systems.
However, the most important trend in the search industry is the proliferation of new computing platforms—and the increasing cross-pollination of data between these devices, PCs, and Web services. These emerging—and merging—markets represent Google and Microsoft’s greatest opportunity for future growth and the greatest threat they pose to each other. In the absence of a common architecture, the information on these systems is almost unsearchable. Today, a user cannot possibly conduct a search such as “Show me everything about the Chinese economy that has appeared in the last month in my e-mail attachments, Word documents, bookmarked websites, corporate portal, voice mail, or Bloomberg subscription.” Many computing platforms, old and new, have no useful search facilities at all. Most existing search tools are available on only one or at most a few platforms; and due to their lack of standardization, they cannot talk to each other.
Thus, while Google provides an excellent service for searching the public Web and has made a good start on PCs with Google Desktop (the hard-drive search tool) and Google Deskbar (which performs searches without launching a browser), the search universe as a whole remains a mess, full of unexplored territories and mutually exclusive zones that a common architecture would unify. Given the size and growth rate of the markets involved, the dominant search provider a decade from now could easily have revenues of $20 or $30 billion per year.
Google Versus Microsoft
Who will win? Google certainly has impressive assets. Moreover, Microsoft does not own the server side of the Web and probably never will. Nor does it control the architectures of the newer computing platforms, whose markets are growing much faster than the PC’s. And in these newer markets, Microsoft faces a painful choice: either provide search technology that will run on, and thereby support, competing platforms such as Linux machines, or let others take the lead.
Yet Microsoft’s control of Windows, Internet Explorer, and Office is a real advantage. For instance, if desktop search tools enjoyed deeper access to the internal document structures of Word and Excel, they would be much more useful. Similarly, operating systems can potentially collect information about user behavior that could improve search tools substantially. Other recent search innovations are really enhancements to the Web browser. Google, Ask Jeeves, A9, Blinkx, Yahoo, and Microsoft are all providing search toolbars that can be downloaded into the browser, and independent developers have created many search-related enhancements to the open-source Firefox browser.
But we know who really owns the browser. Ramez Naam, group program manager for MSN Search, declined to say whether or not search functions would be integrated directly into Microsoft’s Internet Explorer. But a Microsoft executive, who asked to remain unnamed, told me that his company had recently reconstituted its browser development organization. “Microsoft effectively disbanded the Internet Explorer group after killing Netscape,” he said. “But recently, they realized that Firefox was starting to gain share and that browser enhancements would be useful in the search market.” He agreed that if Microsoft got “hard-core” about search (as Bill Gates has promised), then, yes, Google would be in for a very rough time.
Why? Because in contrast to Microsoft, Google doesn’t yet control standards for any of the platforms on which this contest will be waged—not even for its own website. Although Google has released noncommercial APIs—which programmers may use for their own purposes, but not in commercial products—until recently, it avoided the creation of commercial APIs. In late 2004, however, Google announced APIs for its advertising systems and for the Google Deskbar. The advertising APIs could help create an infrastructure of firms dependent on Google’s platform and specializing in the management of automated, Web-based advertising strategies. This could protect Google’s advertising revenues against future price competition from Microsoft. The Google Deskbar APIs, likewise, should encourage third parties to create search functions for the Windows desktop.
These steps, however, are at best half-measures. Google has not yet faced the need for full architectural competition and in some respects has arguably been moving in the wrong direction. It still has not provided open APIs for its core search engine. (Raúl Valdés-Pérez, Vivísimo’s CEO, says that he tried to license Google’s search engine services but was refused.) Furthermore, it sells its search software to enterprises only in the form of a bundled, Linux-based hardware system. This alienates other hardware and software vendors, leaves most of the non-Linux market unserved, and presents a huge opportunity for Microsoft.
Google may feel that APIs are of secondary importance in its coming war with Microsoft. Two Google employees (both of whom prefer not to be named) told me that Google’s leaders believe that the company’s expertise in infrastructure—knowing how to build and operate those 250,000 servers—constitutes a competitive advantage more important than APIs or standards. This could be a major, even fatal, error. Microsoft can certainly obtain or cultivate the skills necessary to operate large-scale computing infrastructures; indeed, it already operates MSN, with nearly 10 million users.
Worse, Google may feel that APIs can wait. Peter Norvig, the company’s director of search quality, told Technology Review, “We’ve had the API project for a few years now. Historically, it’s not been that important: it’s had one person, sometimes none. But we do think that this will be one important way to create additional search functions. Our mission is to make information available, and to that end we will create a search ecology. We know we need to provide a way for third parties to work with us. You’ll see us release APIs as they are needed.”
Those words do not convey much sense of urgency. There is, however, another possibility: Google understands that an architecture war is coming, but it wants to delay the battle. One Google executive told me that the company is well aware of the possibility of an all-out platform war with Microsoft. According to this executive, Google would like to avoid such a conflict for as long as possible and is therefore hesitant to provide APIs that would open up its core search engine services, which might be interpreted as an opening salvo. The release of APIs for the Google Deskbar may awaken Microsoft’s retaliatory instincts nonetheless. For Google to challenge Microsoft on the desktop before establishing a secure position on the Web or on enterprise servers could be unwise.
Strategies and Prescriptions
In all of Microsoft’s successful battles, it has used the same strategies. It undercuts its competitors in pricing, unifies previously separate markets, provides open but proprietary APIs, and bundles new functions into platforms it already dominates. Once it has acquired control over an industry standard, it invades neighboring markets.
In contrast, the losers in these contests have usually made one or more common mistakes. They fail to deliver architectures that cover the entire market, to provide products that work on multiple platforms from multiple companies, to release well-engineered products, or to create barriers against cloning. For example, IBM failed to retain proprietary control over its PC architecture and then, in belatedly attempting to recover it, fatally broke with established industry standards. Apple and Sun restricted their operating systems to their own hardware, alienating other hardware vendors. Netscape declined to create proprietary APIs because it thought Microsoft would never catch up. Google—and Yahoo—would do well to take note.
What will Microsoft do? Publicly, it doesn’t care about building a broad search architecture reaching across many platforms. “There will be a lot of innovation and competition around search by a broad number of vendors, but it is wishful thinking to believe it is a platform tidal wave like the initial emergence of the browser and the Web,” says Charles Fitzgerald, Microsoft’s general manager of platform strategy. And indeed, Microsoft has begun innocently enough: a decent though unspectacular search site, some software, no bundling—nothing, you know, violent. But the company will provide APIs to its Web search engine, and its long-term strategy could be brutal. If it acts logically, it will bundle better search facilities into Internet Explorer and Office; it will build advanced indexing and searching tools into both its PC and server operating systems; and it will alter its own products to make searches of many kinds more fruitful. Search tools could tailor results to a user’s interests, based upon data collected by the operating system. Microsoft could even deliberately cause failures in Google’s products—for example, altering its file formats so that Google’s crawlers could not properly index Word or Excel files. Microsoft has been accused of such conduct repeatedly in the past, notably in its battles against the DR-DOS operating system (an attempted clone of MS-DOS) and Lotus spreadsheet software.
If it acts logically, Microsoft would also perform a “cashectomy” on Google—just as it did in the browser wars when it gave away Internet Explorer. Even with nearly $2 billion in cash, Google is vulnerable to this tactic. For instance, Microsoft could offer free wholesale access to its search engine. Then it could attack Google’s advertising networks by offering free or subsidized advertising placement. These businesses are based primarily upon agreements with third-party websites, most of which have no long-term allegiance to Google. (Google’s forthcoming advertising APIs could, however, change this.) Finally, Microsoft will try to play competitors off against each other, as is its custom. Microsoft thrives when its opponents are fragmented and possess no alternative common standard.
So what should Google do? Given Microsoft’s ferocity in the past, panic might be a productive first step. Google should understand that it faces an architecture war and act accordingly. Its most urgent task must be to turn its website into a major platform, as some other firms have already done. Amazon, as we have noted, does not merely operate a retail website. It has developed proprietary but open APIs that have made it the capital of an electronic economy (see “Amazon: Giving Away the Store,” p. 28). Other merchants set up stores under the Amazon umbrella, and other websites can offer direct links to Amazon’s product pages. Recently, Amazon has gone even further, creating ways for consumers to search and find products without visiting Amazon at all.
Thus, Google should first create APIs for Web search services and make sure they become the industry standard. It should do everything it can to achieve that end—including, if necessary, merging with Yahoo. Second, it should spread those standards and APIs, through some combination of technology licensing, alliances, and software products, over all of the major server software platforms, in order to cover the dark Web and the enterprise market. Third, Google should develop services, software, and standards for search functions on platforms that Microsoft does not control, such as the new consumer devices. Fourth, it must use PC software like Google Desktop to its advantage: the program should be a beachhead on the desktop, integrated with Google’s broader architecture, APIs, and services. And finally, Google shouldn’t compete with Microsoft in browsers, except for developing toolbars based upon public APIs. Remember Netscape.
When Google’s Peter Norvig was read this list—presented not as recommendations, but as things that Google would do—he did not deny any of it. When Technology Review asked, “If we reported any of this, would we be wrong?”, Norvig answered, “We don’t like the word ‘beachhead.’ That implies a war, and we don’t want to go there.” Pressed, he said, “Factually, nothing wrong”—although he stressed that APIs were only one way Google might create a “search ecology.” But historically, proprietary APIs have been the only way to create a loyal customer base—one that can’t readily switch to a competitor.
Big Questions
Would such an architectural strategy work? I’m not sure, but I think so. I also suspect that if Google doesn’t do something like this fast, and Microsoft attacks, Google will go down. Its decline would take longer than Netscape’s precipitous descent, but it would be no less final. And at least during the second term of the George W. Bush administration, it is highly unlikely that antitrust policy would come to the rescue.
Whether Google or Microsoft wins, the implications of a single firm’s controlling an enormous, unified search industry are troubling. First, this firm would have access to an unparalleled quantity of personal information, which could represent a major erosion of privacy. Already, one can learn a surprising amount about people simply by “googling” them. A decade from now, search providers and users (not to mention those armed with subpoenas) will be able to gather far more personal information than even financial institutions and intelligence agencies can collect today. Second, the emergence of a dominant firm in the search market would aggravate the ongoing concentration of media ownership in a global oligopoly of firms such as Time Warner, Bertelsmann, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.
If the firm dominating the search industry turned out to be Microsoft, the implications might be more disturbing still. The company that supplies a substantial fraction of the world’s software would then become the same company that sorts and filters most of the world’s news and information, including the news about software, antitrust policy, and intellectual property. Moreover, Microsoft could reach a stage at which its grip on the market remains strong, but its productivity falls prey to complacency and internal politics. Dominant firms sometimes do more damage through incompetence than through predation.
Indeed, as so many have noted, much of Microsoft’s software is just plain bad. In contrast, Google’s work is often beautiful. One of the best reasons to hope that Google survives is simply that quality improves more reliably when markets are competitive. If Google dominated the search industry, Microsoft would still be a disciplining presence; whereas if Microsoft dominated everything, there would be fewer checks upon its mediocrity.
Disclosure: As the result of selling Vermeer Technologies to Microsoft in 1996, Charles Ferguson still holds a substantial quantity of Microsoft stock, a position which is partially but not completely hedged. He has no other financial interest relevant to this article.
3G與WLAN是八竿子打不著的兩回事
兩者在行動上網的領域根本不會交鋒
文／黃彥達
http://www.digitalwall.com/
無線區域網路的運作方式，是一個基地台（AP，Access Point）加上可以接收訊號的網路卡。在基地台的訊號涵蓋範圍內，所有內含無線網路卡的裝置都可以連線上網。
無線區域網路（WLAN，Wireless LAN）的頻寬隨著標準的不斷改進而大幅提昇，製造成本也不斷往下掉。有許多公共場合早已開始提供WLAN無線上網的環境，例如國際機場的候機室，連鎖咖啡廳等等，使用上相當方便。
這樣的技術是從電腦相關產業發展起來的標準，而3G的技術則是從電信產業發展出來。由於都能提供寬頻無線上網的功能，因此竟引起了兩者究竟是互相競爭，互相取代，還是互補不足的疑問。
互補論者認為，無線區域網路的涵蓋範圍是區域性的，而3G則是涵蓋更大的範圍。所以當使用者在戶外的定點裡活動時（例如：咖啡廳）會需要WLAN，而在非固定環境中（例如：車上，馬路邊）等環境下，會需要3G。
這樣的論點似乎幫看起來處於競爭態勢的兩種技術，找到了和平相處的辦法。但其實就筆者的看法，兩者根本不是互相競爭的技術，也不是互補的技術，他們其實是八竿子打不著的兩種技術，拿在一起比較是有問題的。
大家把這兩種技術相提並論，是因為他們都提供在行動環境下寬頻上網的功能。但如筆者過去六期以來的文章所述，上網功能是3G手機上的非主流功能。因此如果把「上網」這個因素抽離，兩者就突然失去了比較基準。
別忘了3G手機始終是拿來講電話和看電話的，為什麼一定要跟WLAN 去比上網功能？為什麼要把上網的功能看得這麼重？
即便是兩者真的來比較行動上網功能，WLAN與3G也依然各自有一片天。3G行動上網的裝置，絕大部分會是手機，加上少部分的智慧型手機。這些裝置的共同特色，是很像手機，所以螢幕較小，行動上網時，使用者是連線到特殊設計的網站上去，以手機瀏覽。
因此當使用者在瀏覽的時候，是處在比較輕鬆的狀態下的。搭車時，無聊時拿起來打發時間，看一些軟性內容。這也是為什麼到目前為止娛樂性質的內容（例如鈴聲下載，遊戲等等），依然是手機行動上網中歷久不衰廣受歡迎的項目。手機並不適合拿來作工作用途。
而WLAN行動上網的使用裝置，會是電腦與具有上網能力的PDA 。這些裝置的共同特色，是螢幕較大，可以用標準的瀏覽器去看網際網路上的網站而不會失真。因此速度要更快以便呈現更大檔案的內容。
因此當使用者在使用這種方式上網的時候，大部分是正襟危坐的在電腦前，或者使用PDA 上網在進行工作事項，軟性內容較少成為焦點。「搜尋資料」這個項目始終佔據網路使用者行為排行榜的第一名，就是這個道理。
消費者很清楚他們在使用什麼裝置時，該用什麼方法來對待那個裝置，儘管他們可能不自覺。就以這個觀點來看，3G與WLAN依然不是互相競爭或者互補的技術。他們依然是兩種八竿子打不著的技術。
但，有沒有可能從WLAN發展出能打電話的技術？這下子總有可能互相競爭了吧？其實這樣的技術已經有了。但目前因為涵蓋範圍與漫游的限制，只能提供區域通訊，例如架設在辦公室當中成為行動分機。
此種架構在WLAN上面的網路電話，就是行動網路電話，雖然是通話的行為，但是卻是透過網際網路傳送，因此成本非常節省。讓所有的通訊都透過網際網路來傳送，這是目前全世界在努力的目標。
但如果從電信產業看過來，筆者只能說，遲早有一天手機也能打網路電話。而這才是重點，兩種類似技術要交鋒的地方，是語音通訊，而無關乎上不上網（使用者才不會管這通電話打出去是不是網路電話哩）。
只是行動網路電話的技術，看起來不論是3G還是WLAN，都還是相當遙遠的路。現在要論斷誰會勝出恐怕還是太早了些。
文／黃彥達
http://www.digitalwall.com/
無線區域網路的運作方式，是一個基地台（AP，Access Point）加上可以接收訊號的網路卡。在基地台的訊號涵蓋範圍內，所有內含無線網路卡的裝置都可以連線上網。
無線區域網路（WLAN，Wireless LAN）的頻寬隨著標準的不斷改進而大幅提昇，製造成本也不斷往下掉。有許多公共場合早已開始提供WLAN無線上網的環境，例如國際機場的候機室，連鎖咖啡廳等等，使用上相當方便。
這樣的技術是從電腦相關產業發展起來的標準，而3G的技術則是從電信產業發展出來。由於都能提供寬頻無線上網的功能，因此竟引起了兩者究竟是互相競爭，互相取代，還是互補不足的疑問。
互補論者認為，無線區域網路的涵蓋範圍是區域性的，而3G則是涵蓋更大的範圍。所以當使用者在戶外的定點裡活動時（例如：咖啡廳）會需要WLAN，而在非固定環境中（例如：車上，馬路邊）等環境下，會需要3G。
這樣的論點似乎幫看起來處於競爭態勢的兩種技術，找到了和平相處的辦法。但其實就筆者的看法，兩者根本不是互相競爭的技術，也不是互補的技術，他們其實是八竿子打不著的兩種技術，拿在一起比較是有問題的。
大家把這兩種技術相提並論，是因為他們都提供在行動環境下寬頻上網的功能。但如筆者過去六期以來的文章所述，上網功能是3G手機上的非主流功能。因此如果把「上網」這個因素抽離，兩者就突然失去了比較基準。
別忘了3G手機始終是拿來講電話和看電話的，為什麼一定要跟WLAN 去比上網功能？為什麼要把上網的功能看得這麼重？
即便是兩者真的來比較行動上網功能，WLAN與3G也依然各自有一片天。3G行動上網的裝置，絕大部分會是手機，加上少部分的智慧型手機。這些裝置的共同特色，是很像手機，所以螢幕較小，行動上網時，使用者是連線到特殊設計的網站上去，以手機瀏覽。
因此當使用者在瀏覽的時候，是處在比較輕鬆的狀態下的。搭車時，無聊時拿起來打發時間，看一些軟性內容。這也是為什麼到目前為止娛樂性質的內容（例如鈴聲下載，遊戲等等），依然是手機行動上網中歷久不衰廣受歡迎的項目。手機並不適合拿來作工作用途。
而WLAN行動上網的使用裝置，會是電腦與具有上網能力的PDA 。這些裝置的共同特色，是螢幕較大，可以用標準的瀏覽器去看網際網路上的網站而不會失真。因此速度要更快以便呈現更大檔案的內容。
因此當使用者在使用這種方式上網的時候，大部分是正襟危坐的在電腦前，或者使用PDA 上網在進行工作事項，軟性內容較少成為焦點。「搜尋資料」這個項目始終佔據網路使用者行為排行榜的第一名，就是這個道理。
消費者很清楚他們在使用什麼裝置時，該用什麼方法來對待那個裝置，儘管他們可能不自覺。就以這個觀點來看，3G與WLAN依然不是互相競爭或者互補的技術。他們依然是兩種八竿子打不著的技術。
但，有沒有可能從WLAN發展出能打電話的技術？這下子總有可能互相競爭了吧？其實這樣的技術已經有了。但目前因為涵蓋範圍與漫游的限制，只能提供區域通訊，例如架設在辦公室當中成為行動分機。
此種架構在WLAN上面的網路電話，就是行動網路電話，雖然是通話的行為，但是卻是透過網際網路傳送，因此成本非常節省。讓所有的通訊都透過網際網路來傳送，這是目前全世界在努力的目標。
但如果從電信產業看過來，筆者只能說，遲早有一天手機也能打網路電話。而這才是重點，兩種類似技術要交鋒的地方，是語音通訊，而無關乎上不上網（使用者才不會管這通電話打出去是不是網路電話哩）。
只是行動網路電話的技術，看起來不論是3G還是WLAN，都還是相當遙遠的路。現在要論斷誰會勝出恐怕還是太早了些。
GPRS卯上WLAN 使用率不相上下
GPRS卯上WLAN 使用率不相上下
【記者龔小文／報導】
3G第三代行動電話與WLAN無線網路的主流之爭，2.5G 時代提前開打！根據資策會ACI-FIND調查，曾經使用行動與無線上網的民眾中，GPRS占36%、WLAN則占35%，兩者不相上下。最快明年第一季 尾，3G就將和各縣市政府積極佈建的WLAN正面交鋒，爭主流之餘，兩者互補造就的行動、無線雙網上網環境將更有看頭。
資策會調查，曾經 使用行動與無線上網的比例達11%，推估約有238萬人，與去年的4%相比有明顯的成長，雖然滿意度較去年也上升超過10%，但民眾使用GPRS時，最大 困擾是「傳輸速度慢」(37%)，其次是「連線品質不佳」 (19%)，使用WLAN最常遭遇的困難則是「連線品質不佳」(36%)，其次是「傳輸速度慢」(30%)。
有趣的是，民眾真正使用行 動、無線網路的時機和場合，都和業者預期的不盡相同。日本的手機行動上網發展經驗，最常用手機上網的地方就是通勤的電車，資策會的調查中，台灣手機族最常 用GPRS的地方卻是家裡、占46%，其次依序是公眾場所(34%)、工作地點(25%)，然後才是交通工具中或等待時、占22%。
業者 卯起來佈建WLAN無線上網據點，尤其以咖啡廳、連鎖店最多，但是資策會的調查卻顯示，辦公室、會議室才是民眾最常用無線網路的地方，占了38%，其次是 家中 (29%)，然後才是咖啡店(21%)及速食連鎖店(17%)，可見民眾真正攜帶筆記型電腦或PDA在外無線上網的比例並不高。
要 推廣行動、無線上網的普及率，實際應用恐怕是關鍵。資策會表示，沒有無線或行動上網經驗的民眾不曾使用的原因正是沒興趣、沒需要(43%)，沒有實質應用 讓民眾感受到必要性，其次才是沒設備(30%)的硬體普及問題，因為不會使用或花費太高而卻步的人，也分別占16%和13%。
【2004/12/23 民生報】
【記者龔小文／報導】
3G第三代行動電話與WLAN無線網路的主流之爭，2.5G 時代提前開打！根據資策會ACI-FIND調查，曾經使用行動與無線上網的民眾中，GPRS占36%、WLAN則占35%，兩者不相上下。最快明年第一季 尾，3G就將和各縣市政府積極佈建的WLAN正面交鋒，爭主流之餘，兩者互補造就的行動、無線雙網上網環境將更有看頭。
資策會調查，曾經 使用行動與無線上網的比例達11%，推估約有238萬人，與去年的4%相比有明顯的成長，雖然滿意度較去年也上升超過10%，但民眾使用GPRS時，最大 困擾是「傳輸速度慢」(37%)，其次是「連線品質不佳」 (19%)，使用WLAN最常遭遇的困難則是「連線品質不佳」(36%)，其次是「傳輸速度慢」(30%)。
有趣的是，民眾真正使用行 動、無線網路的時機和場合，都和業者預期的不盡相同。日本的手機行動上網發展經驗，最常用手機上網的地方就是通勤的電車，資策會的調查中，台灣手機族最常 用GPRS的地方卻是家裡、占46%，其次依序是公眾場所(34%)、工作地點(25%)，然後才是交通工具中或等待時、占22%。
業者 卯起來佈建WLAN無線上網據點，尤其以咖啡廳、連鎖店最多，但是資策會的調查卻顯示，辦公室、會議室才是民眾最常用無線網路的地方，占了38%，其次是 家中 (29%)，然後才是咖啡店(21%)及速食連鎖店(17%)，可見民眾真正攜帶筆記型電腦或PDA在外無線上網的比例並不高。
要 推廣行動、無線上網的普及率，實際應用恐怕是關鍵。資策會表示，沒有無線或行動上網經驗的民眾不曾使用的原因正是沒興趣、沒需要(43%)，沒有實質應用 讓民眾感受到必要性，其次才是沒設備(30%)的硬體普及問題，因為不會使用或花費太高而卻步的人，也分別占16%和13%。
【2004/12/23 民生報】
Wednesday, December 22, 2004
聯想收購IBM電腦業務 雙方的真正意圖何在？
Nikkei Business
2004/12/22
【日經BP社報道】 東芝被IBM當做抬高自身價碼的“托”！——12月8日中國聯想集團宣佈以總計17億5000萬美元的價格收購IBM個人電腦業務後，電腦業界向東芝投去了“同情的目光”。
東芝出價300億日元
“IBM曾主動和我們接觸過”--從一位東芝官員不經意間透露的這句話中，可以看出IBM至少曾在聯想與東芝兩公司間做過權衡。當然，同時與多家進行交涉的做法在當今並不少見。
由於東芝與聯想開出的價碼相去甚遠，所以本來就不在同一起跑線上。東芝的“Dynabook”與IBM的“ThinkPad”一樣，同屬全球知名的筆記本電腦品牌。不僅銷售網路已經遍佈全球，而且技術力量也口碑極佳。包括不參與價格戰的方針在內，東芝與聯想的基本路線如出一轍。
▲本照片由聯想集團特別提供
與IBM最明顯的區別僅僅在於，東芝剛剛採取了“通過最尖端的AV（影視）功能，向企業和個人用戶提供附加值的戰略”（專務執行董事西田 厚聰）。
對於東芝而言，即使收購IBM的PC業務，也只是業務規模的擴大，不會帶來優勢互補效應。同時還必須對雙方業務中重復的部分進行大規模的調整。而且，2003年秋IBM詢問收購意向時，正是東芝在美國市場上因美國惠普推進的價格戰而最艱難的時候。
至於當時談判提及的收購金額，東芝表示“無可奉告”（西田），但據接近IBM的消息人士稱，“約為200億～300億日元”。如果這一點屬實的話，即使加上IBM個人電腦業務背負的5億美元債務，總計也就是700億～800億日元，還不到聯想出價的一半。與能夠從收購IBM中獲得IBM的品牌價值、技術力量、中國以外的市場與客戶等“額外收穫”的聯想之間，東芝存在著巨大差距，這一點早在談判之前就已經非常清楚。
IBM早在2001年就曾向聯想提出過出售PC業務一事，但當時由於聯想正在優先考慮鞏固國內市場，所以未能成交。此次，聯想從一開始就被當作真正的人選，被當成“托”利用的東芝當然高興不起來。
背上沉重包袱的聯想
另一方面，聯想今後將會面臨巨大考驗。此次收購是否是一次超越自身實力的高風險決策，只要看一下聯想的現狀，即可一目了然。
2003年IBM個人電腦業務銷售額為95億6600萬美元，虧損2億5800萬美元。而聯想2003年度（2003年4月～2004年3 月）的銷售額為232億港元，約為IBM的1/3。純利潤為10億5000萬港元。假如進行單純的合算，收購的同時聯想將變成一家1億多美元的虧損企業。
在17億5000萬美元的收購額中，有6億5000萬美元將以現金方式支付，還有6億美元將以聯想股票的形式支付。另外，聯想還將從IBM手中接過5 億美元的債務。但是截止今年9月底，聯想持有的現金貨幣只有31億港元。現金不足的部分將通過從擔任此次收購談判財務顧問的美國高盛公司那裏接收5億美元的過渡性融資，以及銀行的長期貸款進行籌集。
另外，轉讓的6億美元股票中，普通股約為8億2000萬股，同時還要以每股2.675港元的價格增發沒有表決權的優先股約9億2000萬股（總計約17億4000萬股）轉讓給IBM。IBM由此將成為持股比例佔18.9%的聯想股東。從短期來看，對於流通股的股東而言，收購明顯屬於高風險因素。原因就在於將鉅額虧損的業務連同5億美元債務一併收購後，為了支付這筆費用，不僅要從銀行貸款，而且新股的大量發行還會使現有股東的權益縮水。
香港市場對此反應強烈。12月6日開始停盤的聯想股票9日重新開盤後，股價暴跌。9日～13日的3個交易日裏，其股價下跌了13%，由2.67港元跌至2.33港元。收購消息宣佈後，多家證券公司下調了對聯想的投資預期。
IBM與聯想強調指出，“這是一次相互出資的戰略合作，而非PC業務的出售和收購”。但是，從聯想內部的情況看，與其說是IBM積極投資，倒不如說是不得不通過貸款與發行新股來彌補資金不足更來的自然些。
聯想在雙方的合同中，加入了IBM原則上自收購完成之日起5年內不得出售聯想股票的條款。假如在此期間聯想業績下滑，股價下跌，那麼IBM的資產價值必然縮水。5年時間裏，除允許聯想使用“IBM”、“ThinkPad”和“ThinkCentre”商標及標誌外，IBM方面還將在銷售、金融、維護和客戶響應等方面提供全面支援。從聯想來說，通過將IBM拉入出資者的行列，獲得了IBM的全方位支援。
聯想之所以能夠艱難地完成據稱在電腦業界尚無成功先例的、“老鼠吞象的風險收購”，是因為有中國政府背後的支援。聯想雖是一家民營企業，但國家研究開發機構的中科院在聯想控股公司中佔有57%的出資比例。很明顯聯想自然會受到中國政府的特殊關照。
正因為如此，IBM認為能夠利用聯想的銷售網路及關係網在中國政府資訊系統採購中獲得大筆訂單。而且，通過高價出售虧損業務，將會改善自身的ROA（資產收益率）。“IBM利用小投入獲得了大回報”，日本大和綜研上海事務所首席代表肖敏捷在談到此次收購案時如此評價。
再現“IBM帝國”？
然而，假如目光被帶有“出資”附加條件的出售手段及其中國市場戰略吸引的話，就會誤解IBM的發展戰略。曾作為日本IBM金融業務本部營業人員而大顯身手的日本High Availability Systems公司社長高柳 肇向業界發出了警告。
“IBM已經明確宣佈，要甩掉不賺錢的個人電腦業務，集中精力發展服務業。將經營資源集中到高性能伺服器和服務業以後，很快就將採取新的戰略”。也就是說，志在長期掌權的塞繆爾-帕爾姆薩諾（Samuel Palmisano）董事長肯定已經描繪出一幅就像大型主機時代曾令競爭對手俯首稱臣的絕對領先的發展藍圖。高柳表示在“聽到聯想和IBM的消息後，渾身如同凍僵的感覺”。
IBM還未公開其真正的戰略。不過當它的戰略浮出水面時，包括一直在IBM後面緊追不捨的日本電腦廠商在內，恐怕又將落到IBM的後面。
2004/12/22
【日經BP社報道】 東芝被IBM當做抬高自身價碼的“托”！——12月8日中國聯想集團宣佈以總計17億5000萬美元的價格收購IBM個人電腦業務後，電腦業界向東芝投去了“同情的目光”。
東芝出價300億日元
“IBM曾主動和我們接觸過”--從一位東芝官員不經意間透露的這句話中，可以看出IBM至少曾在聯想與東芝兩公司間做過權衡。當然，同時與多家進行交涉的做法在當今並不少見。
由於東芝與聯想開出的價碼相去甚遠，所以本來就不在同一起跑線上。東芝的“Dynabook”與IBM的“ThinkPad”一樣，同屬全球知名的筆記本電腦品牌。不僅銷售網路已經遍佈全球，而且技術力量也口碑極佳。包括不參與價格戰的方針在內，東芝與聯想的基本路線如出一轍。
▲本照片由聯想集團特別提供
與IBM最明顯的區別僅僅在於，東芝剛剛採取了“通過最尖端的AV（影視）功能，向企業和個人用戶提供附加值的戰略”（專務執行董事西田 厚聰）。
對於東芝而言，即使收購IBM的PC業務，也只是業務規模的擴大，不會帶來優勢互補效應。同時還必須對雙方業務中重復的部分進行大規模的調整。而且，2003年秋IBM詢問收購意向時，正是東芝在美國市場上因美國惠普推進的價格戰而最艱難的時候。
至於當時談判提及的收購金額，東芝表示“無可奉告”（西田），但據接近IBM的消息人士稱，“約為200億～300億日元”。如果這一點屬實的話，即使加上IBM個人電腦業務背負的5億美元債務，總計也就是700億～800億日元，還不到聯想出價的一半。與能夠從收購IBM中獲得IBM的品牌價值、技術力量、中國以外的市場與客戶等“額外收穫”的聯想之間，東芝存在著巨大差距，這一點早在談判之前就已經非常清楚。
IBM早在2001年就曾向聯想提出過出售PC業務一事，但當時由於聯想正在優先考慮鞏固國內市場，所以未能成交。此次，聯想從一開始就被當作真正的人選，被當成“托”利用的東芝當然高興不起來。
背上沉重包袱的聯想
另一方面，聯想今後將會面臨巨大考驗。此次收購是否是一次超越自身實力的高風險決策，只要看一下聯想的現狀，即可一目了然。
2003年IBM個人電腦業務銷售額為95億6600萬美元，虧損2億5800萬美元。而聯想2003年度（2003年4月～2004年3 月）的銷售額為232億港元，約為IBM的1/3。純利潤為10億5000萬港元。假如進行單純的合算，收購的同時聯想將變成一家1億多美元的虧損企業。
在17億5000萬美元的收購額中，有6億5000萬美元將以現金方式支付，還有6億美元將以聯想股票的形式支付。另外，聯想還將從IBM手中接過5 億美元的債務。但是截止今年9月底，聯想持有的現金貨幣只有31億港元。現金不足的部分將通過從擔任此次收購談判財務顧問的美國高盛公司那裏接收5億美元的過渡性融資，以及銀行的長期貸款進行籌集。
另外，轉讓的6億美元股票中，普通股約為8億2000萬股，同時還要以每股2.675港元的價格增發沒有表決權的優先股約9億2000萬股（總計約17億4000萬股）轉讓給IBM。IBM由此將成為持股比例佔18.9%的聯想股東。從短期來看，對於流通股的股東而言，收購明顯屬於高風險因素。原因就在於將鉅額虧損的業務連同5億美元債務一併收購後，為了支付這筆費用，不僅要從銀行貸款，而且新股的大量發行還會使現有股東的權益縮水。
香港市場對此反應強烈。12月6日開始停盤的聯想股票9日重新開盤後，股價暴跌。9日～13日的3個交易日裏，其股價下跌了13%，由2.67港元跌至2.33港元。收購消息宣佈後，多家證券公司下調了對聯想的投資預期。
IBM與聯想強調指出，“這是一次相互出資的戰略合作，而非PC業務的出售和收購”。但是，從聯想內部的情況看，與其說是IBM積極投資，倒不如說是不得不通過貸款與發行新股來彌補資金不足更來的自然些。
聯想在雙方的合同中，加入了IBM原則上自收購完成之日起5年內不得出售聯想股票的條款。假如在此期間聯想業績下滑，股價下跌，那麼IBM的資產價值必然縮水。5年時間裏，除允許聯想使用“IBM”、“ThinkPad”和“ThinkCentre”商標及標誌外，IBM方面還將在銷售、金融、維護和客戶響應等方面提供全面支援。從聯想來說，通過將IBM拉入出資者的行列，獲得了IBM的全方位支援。
聯想之所以能夠艱難地完成據稱在電腦業界尚無成功先例的、“老鼠吞象的風險收購”，是因為有中國政府背後的支援。聯想雖是一家民營企業，但國家研究開發機構的中科院在聯想控股公司中佔有57%的出資比例。很明顯聯想自然會受到中國政府的特殊關照。
正因為如此，IBM認為能夠利用聯想的銷售網路及關係網在中國政府資訊系統採購中獲得大筆訂單。而且，通過高價出售虧損業務，將會改善自身的ROA（資產收益率）。“IBM利用小投入獲得了大回報”，日本大和綜研上海事務所首席代表肖敏捷在談到此次收購案時如此評價。
再現“IBM帝國”？
然而，假如目光被帶有“出資”附加條件的出售手段及其中國市場戰略吸引的話，就會誤解IBM的發展戰略。曾作為日本IBM金融業務本部營業人員而大顯身手的日本High Availability Systems公司社長高柳 肇向業界發出了警告。
“IBM已經明確宣佈，要甩掉不賺錢的個人電腦業務，集中精力發展服務業。將經營資源集中到高性能伺服器和服務業以後，很快就將採取新的戰略”。也就是說，志在長期掌權的塞繆爾-帕爾姆薩諾（Samuel Palmisano）董事長肯定已經描繪出一幅就像大型主機時代曾令競爭對手俯首稱臣的絕對領先的發展藍圖。高柳表示在“聽到聯想和IBM的消息後，渾身如同凍僵的感覺”。
IBM還未公開其真正的戰略。不過當它的戰略浮出水面時，包括一直在IBM後面緊追不捨的日本電腦廠商在內，恐怕又將落到IBM的後面。
平面電視5種技術展開爭霸
2004.12.22 工商時報
邱輝龍/綜合外電報導
日本經濟新聞周二報導，平面電視機已進入全面直接的白熱化競爭型態，過去主要是液晶與電漿電視機間畫面尺寸的競爭，但隨著液晶面板的大型化，這樣的競爭已無意義。
隨著背投式電視與ＳＥＤ式電視也加入戰局，日本各電機廠商將以重點投資專精方式，以各自擅長的重點做為競爭利器。報導指出，隨著競爭益趨全面，未來業界的勢力版圖也將改寫。
報導指出，最近平面電視機市場的攻防，是由液晶主攻，電漿處於守勢。去年之前，兩者以三十七吋型為界，可說壁壘分明，亦即三十七吋以下為液晶領域，以上為電漿的勢力範圍。然而，隨著液晶的大型化，到了今年，分水嶺已前移至四十至四十五吋。
電漿廠商也不甘示弱，準備強化技術加以迎擊。松下電器產業及先鋒認為，若改善省電力性，利用動畫表示性能作為利器，將可與液晶電視分庭抗禮。
然而與此同時，背投式與ＳＥＤ電視也加入戰圈。精工愛普生今年將正式銷售大型背投式電視機。東芝與佳能將聯手開發ＳＥＤ面板，明年夏季發售此種電視機。東芝的目標計劃在二○一○年銷售三百萬台ＳＥＤ電視機。
尤有進者，二○○七年，精工愛普生預定推出「第五種平面電視機」，亦即有機ＥＬ（電子冷光）式電視機。
報導指出，可以預期未來平面電視戰場將是由這五種技術逐鹿中原，日本各電機廠商將以各自專精的技術加強重點投資，以增強競爭力，例如，普與先鋒事實上將分別專營液晶與電漿，新力則轉向液晶，松下則以電漿為主軸。
邱輝龍/綜合外電報導
日本經濟新聞周二報導，平面電視機已進入全面直接的白熱化競爭型態，過去主要是液晶與電漿電視機間畫面尺寸的競爭，但隨著液晶面板的大型化，這樣的競爭已無意義。
隨著背投式電視與ＳＥＤ式電視也加入戰局，日本各電機廠商將以重點投資專精方式，以各自擅長的重點做為競爭利器。報導指出，隨著競爭益趨全面，未來業界的勢力版圖也將改寫。
報導指出，最近平面電視機市場的攻防，是由液晶主攻，電漿處於守勢。去年之前，兩者以三十七吋型為界，可說壁壘分明，亦即三十七吋以下為液晶領域，以上為電漿的勢力範圍。然而，隨著液晶的大型化，到了今年，分水嶺已前移至四十至四十五吋。
電漿廠商也不甘示弱，準備強化技術加以迎擊。松下電器產業及先鋒認為，若改善省電力性，利用動畫表示性能作為利器，將可與液晶電視分庭抗禮。
然而與此同時，背投式與ＳＥＤ電視也加入戰圈。精工愛普生今年將正式銷售大型背投式電視機。東芝與佳能將聯手開發ＳＥＤ面板，明年夏季發售此種電視機。東芝的目標計劃在二○一○年銷售三百萬台ＳＥＤ電視機。
尤有進者，二○○七年，精工愛普生預定推出「第五種平面電視機」，亦即有機ＥＬ（電子冷光）式電視機。
報導指出，可以預期未來平面電視戰場將是由這五種技術逐鹿中原，日本各電機廠商將以各自專精的技術加強重點投資，以增強競爭力，例如，普與先鋒事實上將分別專營液晶與電漿，新力則轉向液晶，松下則以電漿為主軸。
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